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ABSTRACT
Globalization has occurred in various forms over the past century, yet only recently
has it become daily news. This evolving process has created numerous underlying tensions
that are not well understood. While western society has tried to address these tensions, it has
sometimes mishandled them. In this thesis, we examine one such area; the belief that
globalization creates opportunities for significant labor exploitation and why it is necessary,
in the absence of government regulation and enforcement, to set social codes for companies
sourcing products in developing countries in order to prevent this mistreatment.
The thesis examines whether these codes are actually effective in accomplishing their
stated objective of improving social conditions and if not, what plan could better accomplish
this goal. It is divided into five chapters; the first is a review of five central globalization
trends that frame the social code discussion. The second and third chapters look at the
negative publicity that exposed labor problems overseas and assesses whether any of the
known global actors care enough to cure the problems. Starting with the historical
development of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) set up as a response to these problems,
we then examine the codes they promulgated.
In the fourth and fifth chapters, we discuss why the codes are less effective than
desired. The analysis is focused on the alignment and misalignment of institutional and
organizational incentives in three areas: business model design, supply-chain management,
and capital-market development.
While acknowledging the impressive social good accomplished by the MSI's, we
argue that moral purpose by itself is difficult to impose across a wide range of institutions
and cultures. Using more dynamic business models, companies and MSIs can create the
right incentives to eliminate exploitive practices. Finally, we look at how creating such a
virtuous cycle can have a profound positive impact on global trade and encourage
governments to regulate. While modifying business models will prove daunting for many
companies, there is ample economic justification to do so.
Thesis Advisor: Richard M. Locke
Alvin J. Siteman Professor of Entrepreneurship and Political Science

Preface
I originally undertook this thesis to explore if consumers have any significant desire
to drive change in the marketplace. Specifically, I was interested in learning if consumers
would search for and ultimately choose a product because it had a label that certified the
social and environmental conditions under which the product was manufactured (like the
Good Housekeeping seal of approval my mother used to search for). Would there be enough
demand for labeled products to induce other manufacturers to alter their social and
environmental practices? Having been involved in two industries where the vast majority of
the manufacturing jobs were transferred to lower cost countries, I wondered if consumers
ever thought, or more importantly acted upon issues such as jobs or externalities caused by
industry changes. Did they care about how products were made or were they driven primarily
by other considerations such as price?
I learned quickly that consumers, at least for the time being and in any significant
numbers, are not prepared to create large change in the marketplace. Because consumers
were not prepared to instill change, my thesis then evolved into a study of whether and how
better social and environmental practices can be brought to global capitalism. In the absence
of consumer demand, will business self-regulate to improve social and environmental
practices or is leverage needed to get business to change? What form does this leverage take
and can business use it as a catalyst for better performance?
I learned that there are many who are trying to bring better practices to capitalism, in
particular to those who work in developing countries. I am particularly impressed by local
entrepreneurs, who overcome tremendous difficulties to build a business that will create
prosperity for many, and by the non-profit workers who try to also achieve the same goal
through different means. Of course, as you shall see in the thesis, there are also those that
exploit many for personal benefit.
However, my experiences in interviewing entrepreneurs are more benign. It is
through these interviews that I realized that trust, mutual dependency and cooperation are
significantly underrated as factors in development, in both business and as a society. This
thesis seeks to address this issue by demonstrating how incentives that encourage trust and
cooperation also lead to better economic performance. I have known many of these
entrepreneurs through business experience. I am grateful for their honesty and where
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Introduction
"The root of the difficulty is an attitude of mind that has never really died out in this
world-nor perhaps even diminished greatly since the days of the pharaohs-a willingness to
sacrifice human values to other objectives."--John Gardner1
Devaraj is a diligent, hard-working and well-respected Indian entrepreneur. His
company, Charankattu Coir Mills (CCM), inherited from his father, manufactures coir
products that are produced from the fibers of the coconut palms that fill the southwestern
Indian province of Kerala. While he directly employs 175 workers to weave and finish his
company's door mats, rugs and geo-textiles, he depends on a larger Keralan cottage industry
that employs 400,000 people2 to harvest the coconuts, ret the fiber, spin and twist the yam
and supplement his small weaving capacity.
His door mats and rugs are sold throughout the world by some of the largest mail-
order houses, department stores and home center chains; he is also the largest exporter of coir
geo-textiles to Japan. Devaraj has known this business his entire life. Though now close to
50, he took over the business when his father passed away while Devaraj was still in college.
He is the third generation to work in the business; his grandfather had started the business as
a supplier to the British trading firms that controlled the coir industry until Indian
independence in 1947. Though his grandfather was not allowed to sell internationally until
independence, the export-led doormat industry has existed in Kerala for well over 100 years.
' Gardner, J. W. (1981). Self-renewal : the individual and the innovative society. New York, Norton.
2 Coir Board of India. "Coir Board Schemes." from http://coirboard.nic.in/index.htm.
In many ways, not much has changed. There is little mechanization in the
manufacture of a coir doormat; manual labor is the dominant means for accomplishing
everything. Coir is the hairy brown outer part of the coconut. The only way to remove this
durable fiber is to let the coconut sit in pools of salt water for 3-6 months, through a process
called retting. While buyers visit factories like Devaraj's, few see the viscous retting pools
dotting the areas adjacent to the local canal system that signs in Alleppey fondly advertise as
"the Venice of the East". Thousands of workers gather the fallen coconuts from the millions
of palm trees that give Kerala its lush, paradisiacal look; the coconuts are brought to central
stations where they are placed in the retting pools.
When the fiber has begun to separate from the husk, the coconuts are then taken to
individuals who remove all the fiber. The fiber removal, by far the dustiest of the processes,
is the only stage that was moderately improved by mechanization. During the thirties, the
British invented a static spinning disk that the wet coconut is thrown against separating the
fiber. Once separated, the fiber is laid out to dry in the sun, although during the monsoon this
process may be delayed. The dry fiber is gathered by another group of individuals and spun
into yam at home on wooden spinning frames. Indian coir has a very short staple length, is
very coarse and thus, according to Indian manufacturers does not lend itself to machine
spinning, although the Sri Lankan coir industry--four hundred miles away-uses primarily
mechanized spinning equipment.
Once the yam is spun, more individuals gather it up and take it home to weave
doormats on wooden frame looms. Even when most exporters, as did Devaraj, branched out
into coir carpets and rugs in the 1940's and geo-textiles in the 90's, they chose to weave
these very-wide products on hand looms, as they still do today. Devaraj's company buys
doormats for export from the cottage trade, using his employees to only trim or print on the
mats, but weaves rugs and much of the geo-textiles mainly with his employees. To satisfy his
needs, Devaraj buys from 50 subcontractors that employ an average of 10 people each; he
estimates that they supply him with 80% of their production so it can be presumed that
Devaraj employs another 400 people indirectly 3.
The cottage industry, with its army of workers, is overseen by a government
organization, the Coir Board and an affiliate organization, the Coir Industrial Relations
Committee (CIRC) which sets minimum wages, working standards and offers certain
benefits, though it is not known for rigid enforcement4. Devaraj, his father and their
predecessors have relied upon this supply chain for years in their effort to grow their
business. It served them well with Devaraj winning multiple awards from the Coir Board for
his exporting prowess.
Yet in 2003, Devaraj's company became the first firm in the coir-industry world-wide
to become certified by a New York-based NGO, Social Accountability International (SAI),
for managing its business according to social and labor standards (SA 8000) promulgated by
SAI. When asked why he did this in addition to the ISO 9001 and 14001 certificates his
company has, Devaraj responded that he hoped it would help him become credible in the
eyes of potential European and US customers.
Devaraj's decision to follow social standards issued half a world away, by an
organization in a highly developed country, speaks to the paradoxes that surround
globalization. Why would a company that had not altered its supply chain in over half a
3 Devaraj (2006). Personal Interviews With Devaraj, Jan-Feb 2006. Hannover, Boston.
4 Ibid.
century expect to get new business, not by product innovation, but by complying with foreign
social standards, especially since it was already certified in quality processes? How possibly
could any organization certify social compliance in an industry where 90% of the work is
done by independent contractors in a home work environment with loosely enforced
regulation?
The coir doormat industry is a very small part of the globalization story, but it is a
good place to start because it has been a global business since its inception and has changed
very little, if any, over the last century. We shall continue to revisit Devaraj and Kerala in the
following pages for exactly the same reasons.
The fact that Western customers now care about how doormats are made, when they
didn't for so many years, is the starting point for this thesis. We shall look at the intersection
of global trade-in this case, the business of manufacturing products in low-cost developing
countries-with moral purpose-the belief that globalization creates opportunities for
significant exploitation and why it is necessary, in the absence of government regulation and
enforcement, to set social and other codes for companies sourcing products in developing
countries in order to prevent this exploitation. These codes have evolved independently and
while there are presently initiatives toward some degree of standardization; multiple
organizations are promoting different codes they believe help improve or will solve
globalization's social challenges.
Overview
This thesis will examine whether these codes are actually effective in accomplishing
their stated objective of improving social conditions and if not, what plan could better
accomplish this goal. It is divided into five chapters; the first is a review of five central
globalization trends that will help frame the social code discussion. The second chapter looks
at the negative publicity that exposed labor problems overseas and assesses whether any of
the known global actors care enough to cure the problems. This review allows us to better
understand why and how present social codes came into existence.
The third chapter analyzes the current social codes and labels created by the multi-
stakeholder initiatives (MSI's) as a response to the negative publicity (such as SA 8000). We
see if these social codes help correct the conditions that engendered the publicity. Through
research and interviews with these stakeholders, we examine the incentives that these codes
create and determine whether the incentives will get the desired results. The analysis is
focused on the alignment and misalignment of institutional and organizational incentives in
three areas: business model design, supply-chain management, and capital-market
development.
In the fourth and fifth chapter, we discuss why the codes are less effective than
desired, how to improve them and ultimately how to create an environment where they will
naturally evolve into a priority for governmental regulation and enforcement. We show that
the business models employed by many companies coupled with the reactive nature of the
social codes create negative incentives, lack of cooperation and mistrust that cannot
overcome the historical tensions presented in section one.
While acknowledging the impressive social good accomplished by the MSI's, we
argue that moral purpose by itself is difficult to impose across a wide range of institutions
and cultures. Though consumers could theoretically support social labeling initiatives and
drive change, they have shown little interest for the time being other than the small success
of the 'Fair Trade' program. Though business may not ultimately be able to self-regulate;
with the support and pressure of the other stakeholders, business is best positioned to take the
lead. Using more dynamic business models, companies can create the right incentives to
eliminate exploitive practices. Finally, we look at how creating such a virtuous cycle can
have a profound positive impact on global trade, and while modifying business models will
prove daunting for many companies, there is ample economic justification to do so.
Chapter One-Five Central Globalization Trends
Industrialization, De-Industrialization and the Virtuous Cycle
As evidenced by the small coir industry and contrary to the comments in the popular
press, globalization is not a new phenomenon. In many ways, the recent period of
globalization is not even the most dramatic. Richard Baldwin and Philippe Martin have
analyzed the two major waves of globalization that have occurred in the industrialized era5
and found significant similarities and differences. These periods-1i 870-1914 and 1960 to the
present-are notable for de-industrialization in one area and industrialization in another,
"The late 2 0 th century globalization wave started with a very large North-South income gap
and it de-industrialized the North while industrializing the South (or some parts of it). The
first globalization wave industrialized the North, de-industrialized the South and produced
enormous income divergence between groups of nations that were not initially very far
apart"6
Citing studies by Fernand Braudel, Simon Kuznets and K. Chauduri, Baldwin and
Martin argue that Europeans perceived China and parts of India to be much more developed
5 Baldwin, R. E. and P. Martin (1999). Two Waves of Globalisation: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental
Differences. NBER Working Paper 6904. Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research: 1-32.
6 Ibid.
than Europe in the 18th century7 . India's cotton and China's silk industries were world leaders
and formed the basis for early trade, "Clearly, civilizations that invented gunpowder, paper
and oceanic navigation aids were by no means primitive societies just waiting for Europe to
develop."8
Though they do not address the significant policy effects of colonization and attribute
Southern decline to market forces, Baldwin and Martin give an excellent description of the
first wave of globalization as a virtuous cycle for the North, "Higher income leads to a larger
local market in the North and this in turn attracts relatively more investment to the North. Of
course, the higher investment rate leads to a growing market-size gap and the cycle restarts.
The spiral is boosted by the localized nature of technological spillovers. Namely, Northern
industry and innovators benefit proportionally more than the South from increasing
industrialization in the North. As the North experiences this stylized Industrial revolution,
Southern industry rapidly disappears in the face of competition from Northern exports. In a
self-generating process, the North specializes in industry and the South in primary goods." 9
As the South lost its industry and the colonial powers reinforced the primacy of
Northern manufactures through policy and regulation, the southern colonies became
dependent on their European masters for economic growth. The European colonizers left
varied states of infrastructure in their colonies after the rush to independence following




socialism and communism dotted the ex-colonies as newly formed and newly freed countries
tried to create prosperity in their own way.
The failure of these political/economic systems to achieve their stated goals, as
evidenced by the falling of the Berlin Wall and the Chinese communists' embrace of its
"Reform and Opening Policy" gave way to market forces and the global trading system we
have today. The acceleration of this change has surprised many observers. Though economic
growth and prosperity has continued in the developed world, the rapid industrialization of the
south and the relocation of significant manufacturing there has given some in the developed
world the same sinking sense the South had during the first wave of globalization.
The virtuous cycle that had propelled the North to develop has now moved to the
South, Baldwin and Martin continue:
"As industrial investment rises in the South, income rises, spurring local investment,
and Southern industrialization and income growth. Now it is the Southern countries turn to
step on the virtuous industrialization-income growth spiral. Northern industry suffers to some
extent from the new competition. The North experiences some de-industrialization and tends
to specialize more in services. In this last stage, the two regions converge towards even
income and industrialization levels."10
While Baldwin and Martin project that the income convergence is the result of the
relocated virtuous cycle, many in the developed world are now beginning to wonder whether
income convergence actually means incomes shrinking in the North while concomitantly
rising in the South. The notions of "Northern industry suffers to some extent" and "the
North....tends to specialize in services" are observations that have not been quantified yet. Is
1O Ibid.
it possible that a virtuous cycle in one area requires a vicious cycle in another as actually
occurred in the first wave of globalization? What are the repercussions of income
convergence? And finally, is the Southern mistrust created by colonization and its
concomitant North-South income divide disappearing as incomes converge or will the
mistrust shift to the North?
Manufactures, Tariffs and Protectionism
The fact that significant trade occurred between countries during both waves of
globalization is hardly surprising. What may be surprising is that much of the North's
development, including the U.S., came during periods of high tariffs and substantial
protectionism. While it is true that Great Britain, at the height of its empire, was the bulwark
of the global free trade movement, the European continent and the US maintained
protectionist development strategies primarily through high tariffsl". This strategy was
continued by Japan after World War II with excellent results.
Paul Bairoch states, "This fallacy is almost a dogma among neoclassical economists
and can be expressed in the following terms: 'Free trade is the rule, protectionism is the
exception' .... The truth is that, historically, free trade is the exception and protectionism the
rule..." 12
U.S. tariffs averaged in excess of 40% of dutiable imports from 1875-1913. By
comparison, in the period from 1875-1913, the average tariff on manufactured goods in
" Ibid.
12 Bairoch, P. (1995). Economics and World History. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
France was 20%, Germany 10%, Spain 25% and only in the UK was it zero. 13 Trade began to
liberalize with the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948.
By 1996, the tariffs in the US had been reduced to an average of 5-7%, except for
clothing that was covered by separate trade agreements with duties of 19%, and agricultural
products (not including grains) at 38%.14 The European Union (EU) and Japan had similar
tariff structures with some small variations. Echoing Bairoch's point, tariffs in the developing
world were approximately double those of the developed world.
Baldwin and Martin reference trade economist Ed Leamer's work on breaking the
second wave of globalization into two distinct periods that have completely different
ramifications. During the first period from 1950-1979, most of global trade was between
developed countries; however during the most recent period, "trade liberalization and rapid
industrialization changed the nature of the Third World's participation in the world trading
system. In short, they became exporters of industrial goods, especially labor-intensive
industrial goods. This matters, according to Leamer and Wood, since these goods compete
more directly with goods produced in the developed countries." 15 In 1980, manufactured
goods comprised only 15% of the South's exports to the North. Only nine years later,
manufactured goods were at 53% of the South's exports and by 2000, they had increased to
59%.16
13 Baldwin, R. E. and P. Martin (1999). Two Waves of Globalisation: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental
Differences. NBER Working Paper 6904. Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research: 1-32.
14 Ibid.
"' Ibid.
16 UNCTAD (2005). UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. Geneva.
The developing world's rapid industrialization was beginning to displace Northern
workers by 1995 and the process has continued to accelerate. In the ten years ending in Sept.
2005, the U.S. textile and apparel industry has lost 57% of its jobs, the electrical engineering
industry 27%, the paper products industry 23% and the computer industry 20%. 17 Germany,
with its more rigid work rules, has seen unemployment increase to 4.6 million workers, a
150% increase since 1990.18
Given conventional wisdom today, the irony the data shows is that under protectionist
tariffs, development occurred and industrial jobs grew. Whether this could be maintained in a
developed economy is a point of debate, but the tensions created by the job losses overseas
contribute to the environment of accelerating mistrust between labor in developed countries
and labor in developing countries.
GATT, MFA and China's Entry into the WTO
As protectionism accelerated during the world-wide depression of the 1930's, the
trading system devolved into a bilateral system. 19 Best evidenced by the creation of the
Japanese 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere', countries tried to dominate regional
markets, in place of larger ambitions. The British focused on trade with their colonies and the
U.S. focused inwardly, leading to the isolationism that prefaced the Second World War.
17 Hornig, F. and W. Wagner (2005). Dueling Titans. Spiegel special 7: 142-146.
'8 Hawranek, D., A. Jung, et al. (2005). Survival of the Fittest. Spiegel special: 62-69.
19 Baldwin, R. E. and P. Martin (1999). Two Waves of Globalisation: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental
Differences. NBER Working Paper 6904. Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research: 1-32.
While it is widely accepted that the Japanese inability to access natural resources in
South-east Asia precipitated their attack on Pearl Harbor, the lack of German economic
expansion through trade also played a role in Hitler's decision to attack neighboring states.
Out of the destruction of World War II, the Generalized System on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) was born in 1947. GATT was an effort to start liberalizing trade multi-laterally as
opposed to the bi-lateral trade that led to the war.20 Another seven rounds of negotiation,
ending with the Uruguay round in 1994, yielded significant tariff liberalizations and more
importantly, led to the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Yet, within the context of this paper, we are actually more interested in what
happened with negotiations on tariffs concerning textiles and apparel. Given the high-labor
factor in textiles, the entrenched-industry interests, the large employment in developed
countries and the low barrier to entry by low-cost countries, these negotiations were much
more contentious and yielded side agreements that created major market distortions that are
just being remedied for the first time in 2006.
Given the strong political leverage of the industry, the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA)
was signed in 1974 allowing countries to impose quotas on textile and apparel imports. These
quotas forced developing countries to specialize in niche markets to receive available quota
and served to lull scale players in the developed world into a false sense of security.
Significantly, the MFA and the varying quota system were renegotiated every four
years, theoretically giving time to the developed countries to assess how to ultimately open
these markets.2 1 In reality, these renegotiations led to changing country and product quotas
20 Ibid.
21 Shelton, R. and K. Wachter (2005). "Effects of global sourcing on textiles and apparel." Journal of Fashion
Marketing and Management 9(3): 318-329.
and the development of the sourcing agent. Agents, such as Li & Fung, and William E.
Connor Company, started in Hong Kong by selling sourcing services that took advantage of
the quota system. In a simple example, they would buy cotton fabric from Hong Kong, where
there might be quota, and ship it to Korea to be cut and sewn, because the quota for sewn
products was full in Hong Kong.
Twenty years later in 1994, the MFA signatories agreed to the Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing (ATC), which phased out the quotas of the MFA over ten years until they were
to end completely in 2005. During this time, the developed world's textile and apparel
industry continued to suffer job losses. As part of an effort to save jobs, the US created two
acts that complicated the already confusing quotas of the MFA.
The creation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative in 1983 and the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000, coupled with North American Free Trade Agreement in
1994, all encouraged the cutting and sewing of garments to take place in low cost countries,
utilizing fabric woven in the United States. Equally distorting to the market mechanism was
the fact that the knowledge and capital for many of these apparel factories came from the
same Asian companies that could not export from their own factories due to quota
restrictions. An example of this distortion is that in the Asian-owned apparel sector in the
small African nation of Lesotho, employment jumped from 15,000 in 2000 to 55,000 in
2004.22
While it is true that higher labor costs had a significant impact on the developed
worlds' textile and apparel industry, the quota system distorted the marketplace in so many
ways that they focused on the wrong areas for growth; the only exception to this being the
22 Field, A. M. (2005). Winter of Discontent. Journal of Commerce. New York: 1.
Northern Italian textile cluster that has survived and prospered by steering away from scale
production. This trend coupled with the sophisticated supply chains of the Asian agent
system led to the lack of any desire by retail customers to be involved in sourcing and forced
most of them to use agents to buy apparel.
Ultimately, despite all of the protectionist agreements, there are essentially no
significant clothing operations in Japan and the U.S.-87% of clothes in Japan are imported
and 89% in the US. 23 In a sense, the agreements did serve to phase out industry job
reductions in the developed world, yet it left a legacy of strong distortion in what countries
are producing what, a sort of mutated textile and apparel eco-system.
Compounding these sourcing efforts initially, China signed the ATC in 2001 and
stood to gain significantly by the end of tariffs in 2004. As it stands now, China has
substantially increased their exports to the US and Europe and as result, has agreed to keep
exports to a specific increase until 2008, when all restrictions will be removed. For the first
time, the world faces essentially free trade in textiles and apparel. Like football players
stepping on Astroturf for the first time, this is a new field requiring an altered strategy for the
players involved.
Capital Market Development
As with manufacture trade, investment and capital flowed freely in both waves of
globalization. Baldwin and Martin state, "While there are several distinguishing features of
the late 20th century financial globalization, many of its elements resemble the wave of
23 Shelton, R. and K. Wachter (2005). "Effects of global sourcing on textiles and apparel." Journal of Fashion
Marketing and Management 9(3): 318-329.
globalization that ended in 1914. Indeed, the only real debate among informed observers is
whether we have returned to 1914-levels of financial integration (Sachs and Warner, 199524),
or have yet to reach those levels (Zevin 198925)." 26
As an example, considering average current accounts as a percent of GDP, the capital
flow in the UK of 2.6% in the period 1989-1996 is the same as 1919-1926 and less than the
4.6% from 1870-1913; likewise the 1.2% of the US is just above the 1.0% of 1890-1913 27-- a
time when most people perceive the United States' development as being solely internal. The
major disparity between these capital flows is the duration of their investment period, "This
difference is that capital mobility at the end of the 19th century seems relatively more
important for long-term than for short-term capital flows." 28
As bi-lateral trade grew in the period before World War I and during the depression,
capital markets also retrenched significantly. The gold standard was abandoned and
governments moved to control access to financial markets. Rajan and Zingales describe the
period, "With their ability to turn on or turn off finance, governments obtained extraordinary
power over private business. In addition, they intervened more directly by nationalizing
industrial firms or by setting-up government-sponsored cartels. In parts, these actions
24 Sachs, J. and A. Warner (1995). Economic reform and the process of global integration. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution.
25 Zevin, R. (1992). Are world financial markets more open. Financial Openness and National Autonomy. J.
Schor and T. Banuri. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
26 Baldwin, R. E. and P. Martin (1999). Two Waves of Globalisation: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental
Differences. NBER Working Paper 6904. Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research: 1-32.
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reflected a distrust of the market; in part, they reflected the inadequacies of past government
policies."29
After World War II, the financial markets opened very slowly. Given that the major
task for most developed countries was reconstruction, limitations on banking and investment
remained strong. In the last twenty years, however, loosening of capital markets has
accelerated. The ability of pension and endowment funds to invest in private equity markets
coupled with the full repeal of the Glass Steagall Act, allowed for more aggressive financial
options and brought capital liquidity, in many forms, to a much larger audience.
Rajan and Zingales write about the threat of incumbents and capital markets and the
point is especially relevant to our thesis subject, "When the financial system is
underdeveloped, a small group of financiers can control whatever limited access there is to
credit. Ironically, the less financiers do to broaden access, the greater is their individual
power...Many of the evils of capitalism-the tyranny of capital over labor, the excessive
concentration of industry, the unequal distribution of income in favor of the owners of
capital, the relative lack of opportunity for the poor-can be attributed, in some if not
substantial measure, to the underdevelopment of finance." 3 0
Rajan and Zingales continue with a description of a Vietnamese investor in a closed
stock market who would face ruin in a major downturn because they would have no
opportunity to diversify away their risk. They contrast this example with an American
investor in Vietnam, who would not be hurt by this downturn because of their risk
diversification. Their point is that if Vietnam allowed an open capital market, then the
29 Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (2004). Saving capitalism from the capitalists : unleashing the power of financial
markets to create wealth and spread opportunity. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
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American investments would reduce the Vietnamese risk premium allowing for significantly
less expensive cost of financing for the Vietnamese company and hence more investment.3 1
Allowing for open markets is one thing but creating the institutions to support them is
another. Foreign investors need assurances that the information they are receiving is
trustworthy; otherwise they will demand a large discount. As markets develop, companies
increase transparency and the more accurate earnings estimates will push their stock prices
up. As prices rise, there are more incentives to deliver better information to investors. 32
Likewise, corporate governance will also change as markets open up. As Rajan and
Zingales had pointed out, closed or small capital markets favor incumbents and in the
developing countries of the world, this is definitely the case. Most public companies in
democratic developing countries are actually controlled by families or a group of closely
related investors. Most of these companies and certainly those in China have close ties to the
government, with some of them partly or wholly owned by the government.
Capital market development now forms a strong tension between incumbents and
newcomers. Though not all of these newcomers are foreign, there is certainly a strong belief
that developed-country investors will tear apart developing countries' financial markets, if
allowed. Hence there is a strong demand for market control, which as a byproduct tolerates
poor institutional development and allows efforts for more economic and social transparency
into companies to falter.
31 Ibid.
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Income Distribution Trends and Inequality Perceptions
"In the globalized society, the split between the upper half of the income distribution
and the lower half in America increases. While globalization brings us this extra prosperity, it
also brings us extra uncertainty, tension, and greater inequality. In America it leads to a
cowed workforce"--Paul Samuelson33
As lower tariffs and the end of protectionism subject companies to intense
competition, labor in the developed world has been through the most volatile period since the
end of World War II. As shown previously, job losses by industry have been significant.
These losses, which started with the primarily semi-skilled or unskilled occupations, have
now moved into the skilled workforce. Outsourcing and offshoring are now widely accepted
business tactics in the developed world, no matter what level of education the workforce may
have.
Faced with risk of losing their jobs to lower paying countries, U.S. and European
workers have become more productive. However, a recent study by Ian Dew-Becker and
Robert Gordon 34 demonstrates that "over the period 1966-2001, as well as over 1997-2001,
only the top 10 percent of the income distribution enjoyed a growth rate of real wage and
salary income equal to or above the average rate of economy-wide productivity growth."3 5
Equally important Dew-Becker and Gordon show that half of the income gains went to the
top 10%.
33 Hornig, F. and A. Jung (2005). "The market has no heart"--Interview with Paul Samuelson. Spiegel special 7:
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34 Dew-Becker, I. and R. J. Gordon (2005). Where Did the Productivity Growth Go? Inflation Dynamics and the
Distribution of Income. NBER Working Paper Series. Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research: 1-
86.
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Using data compiled by Mishel et a136 , Dew-Becker and Gordon describe the rapid
increase in compensation for CEO's in major US corporations, "The ratio of CEO pay to
average worker pay increased from 27 in 1973 to 300 in the year 2000, then fell to 237 as a
result of the stock market crash. Including both cash and equity compensation, the 1989-2000
increase in CEO compensation grew 342 % as compared to 5.8% for the median hourly
wage." 37 As the US moved to a Republican-majority in Congress, labor lost its ability to
promote income equality through legislation or even taxation. Though the corporate scandals
at the turn of the century drew significant attention to corporate governance issues, equality
in pay has stayed in the background.
The ability of management to appropriate a significant percentage of profits has
increased dramatically in the last 10 years. Dew-Becker and Gordon refer to a study by
Bebchuk and Grinstein38 that shows that the compensation of the top 5 executives of 1500
large U.S. public companies (S&P 500, Mid-Cap 400 and the Small-Cap 600) companies
grew over 150% as a percentage of the company's earnings from 1993-2002. Compared to a
sample size of 20,000 companies, these executives earned 5% of the companies' earnings in
1993-95 increasing to 12.8% in the period 2000-02. 39
36 Mishel, L., J. Bernstein, et al. (2005). The State of Working America 2004/2005. Ithaca, Cornell University
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By comparison, CEO's of comparable companies in Europe and Japan earn
approximately one-third of US pay.40 Moreover, CEO's in non-U.S. advanced countries earn
total compensation 19.9 times greater than the average hourly pay, which is less than 50% of
the multiple for US manufacturing companies and 12% of the multiple for large U.S.
company CEO's in 2003. 4 1 But even though the CEO multiple is considerably less in Europe,
CEO pay has still risen significantly with respect to wage-earners; for example in Germany,
CEO pay has risen 89% from 1997-2003, while wages have increased only 1.4%.42
Income inequality is a tension that has yet to be acknowledged, let alone addressed.
The frustration that comes with increased productivity without increased pay will come to the
surface at some time. With respect to this phenomenon, we are particularly interested in the
fact that employees will no longer feel their incentives are aligned with top management and
will lose their trust in their leaders and employers. The leaders' ability to lead change will be
hampered by taunts of hypocrisy and the status quo will prevail.
Why are the trends central?
Table 1 below briefly outlines how the previously mentioned trends create certain
tensions that we will see throughout our discussion of social codes. As we look at whether
global actors care, we can see these tensions played out in all of their responses. When we
40 Mishel, L., J. Bernstein, et al. (2005). The State of Working America 2004/2005. Ithaca, Cornell University
Press.
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42 Bohringer, C., D. Deckstein, et al. (2005). The German Job Roulette. Spiegel special. 7: 40-50.
examine incentives created by social codes, we shall see these same tensions again and when
we finally arrive at our conclusion, we shall see how these tensions can be changed into
better incentives that reinforce rather than fight the trends.
Table 1 Tensions Created by Globalization Trends
Globalization Trend Tensions Created
Industrialization, De- Rapid development in the South favors virtuous cycle there. Developed
Industrialization and the countries' economies and social structure under attack as jobs leave.
Virtuous Circle Expectations of social support diminish as affected companies and
countries cut pension plans, health and other benefits. Northern labor
becomes suspicious of South's intent
Manufactures, Tariffs and Increased levels of outsourcing improve manufacturing skill base in South.
Protectionism Job losses grow and skill base in North evaporates. Developing countries
use selective protectionist measures to encourage faster growth while
developed countries try to force high-cost standards onto developing ones
GATT, MFA and China's Distorted incentives have created intense competition among countries.
Entry into the WTO Developing countries will try to keep low cost of labor as a comparative
advantage and choose to overlook labor and social issues. Threat of no
quotas on Chinese goods reinforces previous issue. Labor in developed
countries look for Chinese dumping practices fostering more mistrust
Capital Market Development Developing capital markets allow for rapid capital inflows and outflows
rompting charges of speculation by developing countries. Incumbents in
developing economies rush to sell shares of newly privatized companies
nd export capital from domestic investment. Politicians look to capitalize
on same trend and force closer link with business.
Income Distribution Trends Uneven income distribution discourages workers in developed countries
and Inequality Perceptions leading to push back on free trade issues. Consumers and employees lose
faith in managers; see system as hypocritical and abandon corporate social
responsibility efforts. Developed countries' consumers overspend to keep
up and severe recession follows
Chapter Two-Labor Problems Overseas; Does Anyone Care?
Signs of Friction and Negative Publicity
As decreasing tariffs accelerated competition, companies aggressively looked for
lower-cost sources. Since many companies chose to use agents or sub-contractors for their
overseas purchases, they believed they were essentially immune to concerns about labor and
social conditions in the source countries. This feeling of security probably existed because
most companies had always done some degree of overseas sourcing and had never suffered
negative repercussions. Yet as labor tensions increased in the US and other developed
countries, it became a matter of time before someone would notice the working conditions
overseas.
Labor, government and industry, tried initially to keep American garment
manufacturing onshore by financing a positive marketing campaign to convince consumers
that "Made in the USA" was an important label and worth shopping for. Roger Milliken's
effort with the "Crafted with Pride in the USA" in the 1980's and Wal-Mart's declaration
that it would sell as much American product as possible met with little success. Studies on
the "Made in the USA" campaign show that just 11% of consumers only buy clothes made in
the U.S. 43 Consumers were more interested in fashion, quality and price.
43 Dickson, M. A. (2001). "Utility of No Sweat Labels for Apparel Consumers: Profiling Label Users and
Predicting Their Purchases." The Journal of Consumer Affairs 35(1): 96-118.
Andrew Ross, labor scholar and anti-sweatshop activist, describes the next step in the
chain of events, as well as his belief why it occurred, "In the 1980's, Nike was able to move
its factories from South Korea and Taiwan to Indonesia, China, Thailand and Vietnam to
exploit lower wages, but the comparative advantage means nothing if consumers are not
willing to pay $125 for a shoe assembled for seventy or eighty cents. If consumer abhorrence
for sweatshops has a decisive impact on sales patterns, all is lost... .Accordingly, the leading
edge of activism shifted away from labeling (Made in the USA), toward the high-end
publicity strategy of targeting the image of large, well-known companies. 44
Jeff Ballinger's research on Indonesian labor conditions in the late 1980's 45 and his
subsequent article in Harper 's magazine46 in 1992 implied that Nike's subcontractors were
exploiting their labor force. The National Labor Committee (NLC), founded by three union
presidents, began to target other garment producers about working conditions in their source
factories. The Gap was targeted in a 1995 NLC campaign that highlighted conditions in
Central American maquiladoras. 47 As a result of a speaking tour organized by the NLC and
picked up by national correspondents, the Gap reached an agreement with the NLC whereby
social codes of conduct would be translated into Spanish (or the source country language)
and outside monitors would be permitted to inspect for labor and safety violations.48 Through
the media, this was the first time the general public were made aware of codes and
44 Ross, A. (2004). Low pay, high profile : the global push for fair labor. New York, New Press : Distributed by
W.W. Norton.
45 Ibid.
46 Ballinger, J. (1992). The New Free-Trade Heel: Nike's Profit's Jump on the Back of Asia's Workers. Harper's
Magazine: 46-48.
47 Ross, A. (2004). Low pay, high profile : the global push for fair labor. New York, New Press : Distributed by
W.W. Norton.
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monitoring in overseas factories, although Levi Strauss had actually issued workplace codes
of conduct in 1991.49
In 1996, the NLC exposed conditions in a Honduran factory producing clothes for a
Kathie Lee Gifford licensed-collection sold at Wal-Mart. Facing considerable scrutiny and
with the help of a New York publicist, Kathie Lee required that all factories producing her
line had to be independently monitored for labor violations, forcing Wal-Mart to join
companies issuing codes of conduct.50
'Sweating', the Labor Movement, and Labor's Reaction
Not all exploitation was in the developing world. The garment industry has always
had labor challenges, as Ross points out in his history of the term 'sweating', "In the
nineteenth century, the term sweating referred to the system of subcontract, which, in
contrast to the integrated and supervised factory system, consisted of farming out of work by
competing manufacturers to competing contractors. The small contractors 'sweated' as much
labor as they could out of immigrant workers. Sweating was indigenous to garment
production because of its division of labor, separating the craft processes of design, marking
and cutting, from the labor-intensive sewing and finishing, and organized around a three-tier
system of small producers--the inside shop, the contractor, and the home. In this industry on
49 Freeman, R. B. (1998). What Role for Labor Standards in the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: 1-36.
50 Ross, A. (2004). Low pay, high profile : the global push for fair labor. New York, New Press : Distributed by
W.W. Norton.
wheels, neither the jobber nor the manufacturer nor the contractor was responsible for one
other's conduct; each could blame others for flagrant abuses of the system." 51
In many ways, the history of the textile and apparel trades is the history of the labor
movement. Unfortunately, like much social change, it required tragedy to raise awareness of
the issues at hand. The Uprising of 20,000, the Great Revolt of 1910 and the Triangle
Shirtwaist Factory fire in 1911, where many workers fell to their death from the eighth floor
as a result of exit doors being locked, led to the development of collective bargaining, new
safety regulations and the eventual introduction of worker's compensation laws. Ross defines
this gain as the labor-capital social contract, "Organized labor learned that management
would make big concessions in return for uninterrupted production, while the manufacturers
found a way for labor to accept their coming creed of scientific management and industrial
efficiency." 52
The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), the organizer of the
1910 revolt, had its share of volatility throughout the first half of the 2 0 th century. It was
however, instrumental in fostering unions in other industries that employed immigrants such
as the auto and steel industries. Ultimately, The ILGWU reflected the continued migration of
the garment industry offshore and its membership continued to shrink, until it merged with
the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (ACTWU) to form the Union of
Needletrades, Industries and Textile Employees (UNITE) in 1995.
UNITE continued to lobby for enforcement of labor conditions and under the
sympathetic ear of the Clinton Administration, Secretary of Labor Robert Reich started again
~' Ibid.
52 Ibid.
to inspect domestic garment producers. In 1995, Department of Labor (DOL) inspectors
caught a California producer, who had used nominal slave labor in the form of
undocumented workers locked up 24 hours a day, to sew garments for large American
retailers. 53
Working with UNITE, the White House convened a presidential task force, the
Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP), to set workplace (which have since been expanded and
referred to as social) codes. The AIP was the start of multi-stakeholder initiatives; in addition
to UNITE, its members were a diverse group that included the Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the National Consumers League, the
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union and industry representatives from well-
known retailers such as L.L. Bean, Patagonia, Liz Claiborne, Phillips Van Heusen and
Nike.54 The AIP ultimately gave rise to the Fair Labor Association (FLA), which we will
examine in the next chapter.
UNITE also supported grass-root student movements that became the next outspoken
critics of the global apparel industry. The group, United Students against Sweatshops
(USAS), lobbied college administrations to develop codes of conduct for factories that
produced university licensed apparel. USAS believed that industry involvement in the FLA
compromised their independence and encouraged their respective universities to join the
Workers Rights Consortium (WRC-which will also be discussed in the next chapter).
53 Ibid.
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Labor, in conjunction with the students and other human rights organizations continue to
expose workplace conditions. 55
While we will examine the social codes of conduct in depth later in this thesis, the
question we ask at this point: Is the fact that social conditions overseas could be found in the
U.S., with its tighter laws and enforcement, an indication that either there are unscrupulous
operators in both locations or perhaps that the supply chain operations of the hyper-
competitive retail trade had evolved into more of a demand chain with a differing and
completely new set of expectations?
Are Global Standards Necessary or Discriminatory?
"You cannot expect a low-income, low-productivity country to have the amenities
that America enjoys. It's unfair to expect labor and environmental standards as strict as ours.
That is unrealistic. I grew up in a steel town, in Gary, Indiana. That was a long time ago,
almost 90 years. If a worker's leg got caught by the hot molten steel, they didn't even stop
work. You can see how things have improved over the years, and that will happen in China
too."-Paul Samuelson 56
As campaigners called for improved social and environmental standards in
developing countries, the issue took on significant political overtones. Leaders in the
developing world argued that standards imposed by the developed world were essentially
protectionist in nature. Citing the fact that labor movements were instrumental in exposing
working conditions overseas, developing countries (and their companies) stated that labor's
intent was to drive up their cost thereby keeping the jobs in the developed world. This debate
" Ibid.
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has been framed by the media, depending on which side they take, as either the race to the
bottom or the race to the top. Steven Suranovic describes it according to fairness arguments,
"Advocates of standards agreements seem more likely to use moral justifications arising out
of the golden rule fairness principle especially when condemning the purported harm caused
to individuals as a result of current policies. They also more often use inequality and
discrimination arguments. Opponents of standards agreements are more likely to use
sovereignty and rule of law agreements. Also, since many opponents of these types of
agreements are economists, they tend to assess the extended costs and benefits of standards
and support those policies that are most efficient." 57
Andrew Ross is clearly in the first camp, "Labor rights are not privileges that carry a
price tag, and poverty does not preclude entitlement to them. There is no reason why core
labor standards (recognized by the ILO--International Labour Organization) should be
subject to a costs-benefit analysis. In any case, whatever increased costs are incurred from
observing these rights should not be borne by host nations, but by the multinational firms that
reap vast profits from the sweatshop system" 58
Jagdish Bhagwati, the free-trade supporting economist is just as clearly in the second
camp, "The developing countries cannot then be blamed for worrying that the recent
escalation of support for such a (Social) Clause in the WTO in major OECD countries
derives instead from the desire of labour unions to protect their jobs by protecting the
industries that face competition from the poor countries. They fear that the moral arguments
57
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are produced to justify restrictions on such trade since they are so effective in the public
domain. In short, the 'white man's burden' is being exploited to secure the 'white man's
gain'. Or, to use another metaphor, 'blue protectionism' is breaking out, masking behind a
moral face." 59
As Suranovic suggests, Ross and Bhagwati use different frameworks to support their
side. Certainly Bhagwati refers to the negative publicity generated by the labor activists as
'so effective in the public domain' and since he doesn't believe that standards should be
mandated, does not mention their costs. Ross, however, also states that developing countries
should not have to pay these costs as they should be absorbed by foreign companies
operating overseas. This idea may seem impractical given the current sourcing environment
but we shall revisit it when we discuss business models in Chapter Four. The subject of
global standards, and in particular implementation if they were to exist, is intrinsically tied to
the protectionist tensions of globalization and any solution must pay careful attention to
mitigate the friction, not make it worse.
What about the WTO, ILO or Country Regulation?
The difficulty in getting an agreement on what role for standards has been borne out
by the history of the ILO. The ILO was formed as a result of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.
Christopher McCrudden and Anne Davies describe its function succinctly, "The ILO was
given a broad mandate: to establish international labor standards in the form of Conventions,
59 Bhagwati, J. (1995). "Trade Liberalisation and 'Fair Trade' demands: Addressing the Environmental and
Labour Standards Issues." The World Economy 18: 745-759.
to persuade states to join these Conventions and to resolve disputes concerning their
implementation." 60 It was a seemingly simple task that has not been completed 86 years later.
After the end of World War II, the ILO was to work with the International Trade
Organization (ITO) to link labor standards and trade. When the ITO failed and GATT was
created on a supposedly temporary basis, there were no longer any labor linkages. 6' This
discussion has ensued and was placed again on the negotiating table with the formation of the
WTO. The debate got louder and the distance between the developed and developing world
grew larger.
Ultimately, the WTO pushed the matter back to the ILO, stating that labor standards
were a labor issue and ultimately belonged with ILO.62 The ILO responded with a two-
pronged strategy; first they would adopt a core set of labor standards, which by virtue of
membership all countries should be committed to and surprisingly, second they should
introduce a labeling program that would identify products that were produced in locations
that adopted these standards. 63
The ILO adopted the core labor standards and issued a Declaration to this effect in
1998. It did not adopt the labeling program in yet another failure to agree on standards,
"However, the attempt to link these to a labeling scheme was not accepted by the main
decision-making body of the ILO, in large part because of the opposition of developing
60 McCrudden, C. and A. Davies (2000). "A Perspective on Trade and Labor Rights." Journal of International




countries, the same countries which had been so adamant that the ILO was the place to deal
with these issues." 64
The ILO 1998 Declaration covers the following four areas65:
* Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining
* The elimination of forced and compulsory labor
* The abolition of child labor
* The elimination of discrimination in the workplace
Ultimately, society is the determinant of what kinds of behaviors are acceptable and
what are not. As the history of the ILGWU points out, many times citizens must agitate
before politicians propose, pass and enforce legislation. The development of social standards
has taken a long time and is still very much a dynamic process. While international bodies,
such as the ILO, have accumulated the knowledge of the many labor struggles that have
taken place in the developed world, it has no jurisdiction over countries and can only hope
that countries will abide by the ILO conventions.
In reality, many developing countries actually have labor laws; China and India being
good examples. The problem is in the enforcement. As the example of Devaraj shows, a
country's desire to provide work in a competitive world and enforcement of labor laws are
not always compatible. While history shows, along with Paul Samuelson's quote, that as
living standards rise, governments take more interest in enforcing standards, it will be awhile
64 Ibid.
65 ILO. (2006). "ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights At Work." from
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.INDEXPAGE.
before developing countries can be expected to enforce anything remotely close to the
standards in the developed world.
Do Consumers Care?
"The market has neither a heart nor a brain; it just does what it does."--Paul
Samuelson66
When Ross discussed having companies absorb the costs of higher standards, he also
mentioned consumers, "Even if the costs were passed on to the consumers (a more practical
assumption), there is a reasonable expectation that they could be absorbed without much
pain." 67 Richard Freeman, to the same point, states, "Demand for standards is a legitimate
demand based on the willingness of consumers to pay more for products made under decent
conditions."68 Certainly in a market-based economy, consumer choice affects profoundly the
behavior of producers. If a consumer says no, then either the manufacturer finds another
consumer, changes the product, or goes bankrupt. If as Freeman asks, consumers are willing
to pay for higher standards, then certainly there would be higher standards. But the question
is: are they willing to pay? Or to that matter, are they even willing to search and make a
choice?
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Consumers have been the primary beneficiaries of globalization. Inflation has been
dramatically reduced in the developed world; one of the primary drivers of this phenomenon
is the continuing and significant decline in the price of manufactured goods. Whether driven
by technological improvements, productivity gains or low-cost labor, the price of acquiring
material happiness has dropped significantly.
Research shows that while the majority of consumers are delighted to enjoy this
benefit, they have raised little concern about the tensions caused by globalization. A survey
conducted by the largest British independent market research firm MORI (Market and
Opinion Research International) in 2003 highlights the potential misperceptions that may
exist in the public mind about consumers. MORI found that three-quarters of the British
population (74%) would be influenced in their purchasing decisions by more information on
a company's ethical and social behavior. The key word is influenced because ultimately
MORI identifies only 15% of the population to be CSR activists, those that would be inclined
to act on this information as opposed to be merely influenced.69
Likewise, other MORI surveys confirm the same or even smaller amounts of
consumers that would be classified as ethical, "In general terms, we find that the propensity
for consumers to be concerned about these issues still far outstrips ethical consumer
behavior... .Looking at past consumer behavior, only one in seven (14 per cent) report they
have chosen a product in the last year because of a company's ethical reputation and one in
six (17 per cent) say they have boycotted a product on ethical grounds."70 Interestingly
enough, the same research also show that 29 per cent have bought a product because of an
69 MORI. (2003). "Ethical Companies." from http://www.mori.com/polls/2003/mori-csr.shtml.
70 Worcester, R. and J. Dawkins (2005). Surveying Ethical and Environmental Attitudes. The Ethical Consumer
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established charitable link in the last year."71 Finally, a study that MORI conducted in 2000
for the Co-operative bank showed that only 5 per cent of the British population makes
purchases based solely on ethical criteria.72
In a 2000 U.S. survey of potential buyers of a "No Sweat" label, Marsha Dickson
found similar results to the MORI studies, "Last, the empirical findings of the study were of
reasonable magnitude. Only 16 percent of the sample was included in the potential No Sweat
market segment. Nearly half of the sample showed no indication whatsoever that they would
use the label and another 36 percent clearly placed higher priority on price. Certainly, if
social desirability were biasing results, there would be a far greater number of respondents
indicating they would use the label." 73 In a 2005 article that profiled ethical apparel
consumers, Dickson states, "The large proportion of consumers unwilling to sacrifice their
own product needs for price, quality, color and fiber content is not surprising and similar to
findings from previous research. For most consumers considering an apparel purchase,
ethical attributes of a product take a back seat to product features." 74
While it is apparent that currently there are not significant numbers of consumers to
reward companies for insisting on high standards throughout their supply chain, consumers
have been much more likely to boycott companies that behave poorly. This is evidenced by
71 Ibid.
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the choice of activists to seek negative publicity for brand-focused companies, such as the
GAP, Nike etc.
In particular, boycotts have the benefit that they do not need to be successful to be
effective. Rob Harrison cites Craig Smith's research on the subject, "He described boycott
effectiveness as attaining a reduction of sales as the boycotted product, and distinguished it
from boycott success, which is the achievement of the boycott's political objectives." 75
Harrison displays in the same article a table showing 37 successful consumer boycotts since
1986, ranging from Gillette and Avon stopping animal testing to Shell's disposal of the Brent
Spar platform on land to John Lewis ending employee shooting trips.76What is remarkable
about this table is that not one successful boycott is listed for a producer exploiting labor
conditions in developing countries.
Whether this indicates that consumers are not sensitive to this issue raises another
question; do consumers get enough information to understand the problem? Or equally
important, do consumers believe that their decision will have any effect on something they
think is beyond their control? The decision to not buy something is easier than choosing what
product to buy. In a boycott, that producer or product is clearly delineated by the boycott
organizer. We shall look at the reactions of companies to the negative publicity they received
in another section, but it can be assumed that part of their decision in how to respond was to
prevent a boycott that would do more damage to their brand.
The difference between positive choice and a negative decision is directly related to
information. Sir Robert Worcester, the founder of MORI, writes; "Currently, therefore,
75 Clouder, S. and R. Harrison Ibid.The Effectiveness of Ethical Consumer Behavior: 89-102.
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messages about companies' ethical behavior are largely not getting through to consumers.
Top-of-mind awareness of companies' contributions to society remains fairly low...This
underlines the potential impact of engaging a company's customers and (not least) it
employees in ethical programmes so that their informal communication networks can be used
to spread the word. In particular, employees tend to be perceived by external stakeholders as
particularly credible commentators on a company's activities..."77
Socially Responsible Investors, Transparency and the GRI
In contrast to consumers, investors have long tried to gather information about
companies' behaviors. Religious groups have been sensitive to their investments since the
1920's; the Pioneer Fund opened in 1928 and since 1950 has screened stocks on behalf of
Christian investors to exclude those that are involved in gambling, alcohol and tobacco. 78 It
was the advent of the Pax Fund in 1971 and the formation of the Interfaith Center for
Corporate Responsibility in 1976 that started the socially responsible investment (SRI)
movement. With $639 billion in assets in 1995 and more than $2.29 trillion in assets in
2005, the SRI movement has now become an industry 79
There are three areas of social investing: socially screened mutual funds and separate
accounts, shareholder advocacy investors and community investing. By far the largest
77 Worcester, R. and J. Dawkins Ibid.Surveying Ethical and Environmental Attitudes: 189-203.
78 Social Investment Forum (2006). 2005 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States:
A 10-Year Review. Washington, D.C., Social Investment Forum: 1-66.
79 Ibid.
amount, $1.7 trillion, is dedicated to screening s0 . Of this $1.7 trillion, $200 billion is in
invested through mutual funds and the balance, $1.5 trillion, through institutional investors,
primarily public pension plans. Screened funds use both exclusive and inclusive screens,
where exclusive indicates that the fund will exclude investments because of certain
unacceptable behaviors and inclusive indicates that the fund will include companies for
certain desirable behavior. Funds will generally screen for 2-4 screens with the seven most
important by asset size reflected in the Table 2 below:81
Table 2 Social Screening by Asset Size









Shareholder advocates are classified as investors that file one or more shareholder
resolutions on social issues. Shareholder advocacy assets total $700 billion and are a mix of
socially screened funds and institutional investors who do not screen82 . In 2005, these






With respect to our thesis topic, global labor standards through social codes; twenty-five
resolutions were proposed in 2005, eight were withdrawn and fourteen were voted on. The
average votes cast in favor of these resolutions was 11.4%.84 Given the results of the
shareholder votes, it can be assumed that the level of interest of stockholders in global
standards is not that different of consumers. Likewise, judging by the ranking of screens,
labor relations are also a relatively low priority for institutional investors.
Though it appears that investors will not force companies to improve labor standards,
they have built significant momentum in the form of getting companies to at least report their
behavior. Since SRI investment firms spend so much effort screening for sometimes
intangible behavior, they have strongly advocated social and environmental reporting.
Sometimes referred to as 'triple bottom line accounting', SRI investors have financed a non-
profit group, the Global Reporting Initiative, to build standards that will allow a common
framework for reporting.
Moreover, the environmental lobby and the recent highlighting of energy issues have
pushed the topic of sustainability reporting to the forefront of SRI interest. Of the twenty-five
highest votes received by shareholder resolutions put forth by shareholder advocates, eight of
them, all receiving more than 30% votes, concerned enacting sustainability or GRI
reporting .
The effort to seek greater corporate transparency may be driven partially by the ethical
lapses of business leaders over the last ten years, yet there is also a sincere desire to have
companies at least report behavior that they may be slowly trying to change. Whether GRI
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
reporting may be considered good publicity or brand enhancement is certainly subject to
debate, it seems destined to grow and will fit into our thesis in the next chapter as we look at
social codes.
The Purpose of a Corporation
It is difficult to examine companies' responses to globalization without first exploring
why corporations exist in the first place. There are no right answers to the question but it can
be asserted that corporations are a creation of society and society did have a particular reason
for corporations. In a capitalistic society, corporations exist to create and distribute economic
benefit. In societies that promote competition, it is fair to say that only those corporations
that are able to maximize their benefit while minimizing their resources utilized are the ones
that survive.
However, irrespective of what business philosophers and economists may argue,
ultimately companies serve the purpose of their owners. Certainly publicly traded companies
offer far more transparency than private companies, yet in reality, one would still be hard
pressed to find more than a few companies that maximize profit. Can companies with
corporate jets and idyllic retreats claim to maximize profits?
Many public companies are actually controlled through two classes of stock-one
that trades and one that doesn't. In the case of companies that are involved in labor problems
overseas; two of the most prominent targets of activists, the Gap and Nike are both
thoroughly controlled by their founder and their families. At the Gap, Donald Fisher and his
family own 31 % of the outstanding shares8 6. Philip Knight has even stronger control at Nike;
he owns 23% of the outstanding shares and 92% of the voting stock87 . Certainly their
concentrated ownership has served the financial interests of the company and their public
shareholders, but they can also implement change at their companies through control in a
much easier fashion than if the owners are primarily diversified financial investors. There is
no risk of a hostile takeover of these companies, just the risk that the value will decrease.
Does this mean they are responsible for labor problems? Not necessarily, as like any
company they have many stakeholders-it is however reasonable to say that they have wide
discretion about how their companies pursue policies. Concentrated ownership interests can
also be found in many other American apparel and footwear brands, including Columbia,
Timberland, Kenneth Cole, Patagonia and Levi-Strauss.
Companies' Efforts and Reputational Risk
Of all the actors we have discussed so far, it is natural that companies come last. In
many ways, they are the obvious choice to impose standards throughout their supply chain,
yet it is only when they perceived themselves at risk that they chose to act. Like Andrew
Ross's description of 'sweating', companies that purchased products overseas initially took
the "we aren't responsible for our suppliers" defense. The history of their responses is
essentially the history of their decision to do everything, but take ownership of the problem.
86 Yahoo Finance. (2006). "Gap Inc. Ownership." from http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=GPS.
87 Patterson, A. (2006). "Phil Knight's Not Diversified." from
http://www.fool.com/news/commentary/2006/commentaryO6020305.htm.
Nike, the Gap, and every company involved in negative publicity has moved to
estimate the reputational risk they have and to mitigate it. Generally, they have chosen to do
this through multi-stakeholder partnerships. The rapid proliferation of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in developing countries allows for a different perspective in source
countries and companies have aligned with them to help monitor and assess labor conditions
at the factory level. While these partnerships will be discussed in the next chapter, the focus
here is on why haven't companies chosen to absorb manufacturing or create stronger
partnerships as they might if they had a failing supplier in a developed country.
Looking at this issue a different way, developed countries do legislate to force social
change. An example of this would be certain set asides for minority or woman owned
businesses. Many times companies will issue long term contracts, buy preferred stock or
generally set up long term incentives to encourage these companies to flourish. Yet these
same companies have done nothing to encourage better behavior overseas. Why have they
not done this?
As we can see previously, there is little incentive to do so directly. Companies have
quantified the risk to their reputations (or brands) and determined that they can afford to be
conservative in their reactions. They have sensed that consumers may care, but only to a
relatively small extent; SRI investors may screen for these traits, but will only sell their
stock-very few will play active governance roles and file shareholder motions; developing
countries are competing for employment and will be slow to legislate and enforce standards;
the ILO and WTO will be unsuccessful in reaching consensus on trade and labor linkages;
the only threat is the negative publicity generated by primarily Western NGOs and labor
organizations. While some may question the true motivation of organized labor, the result is
the same--at least someone is watching.
As companies moved closer to partnering with multiple stakeholders overseas
because they believed it was the lowest cost way or perhaps, best way forward; they moved
more aggressively in the developed world to capitalize on the growing corporate social
responsibility (CSR) movement. Like GRI reporting, companies believed that greater
transparency into their operations and exposure to the companies' good deeds would help
give capitalism and the company a better image, "But a more fundamental question remains:
what is CSR? Increasingly CSR is a defined as a corporations' willingness to engage with
stakeholders on the social and environmental impacts of its business and to make
fundamental improvements as a result of the engagement. CSR has become the sign of good
management" s 8 Hannah Jones, the vice-president of corporate responsibility at Nike
reinforces this definition, "We're moving away from just risk management to an
understanding that corporate responsibility can contribute to the bottom line of innovation
and operational efficiencies." 89
Nike's progression from worrying solely about reputational risk to trying to build
capacity along the supply chain evolved from the work of MSI groups involved with 'social
codes'. The question Hannah Jones' comment raises is will this be any more effective than
before?
88 Biello, D. (2005). CSR: three little letters that just might change the world. Supplement to the New York
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Chapter Three-Multiple Stakeholders and Social Codes
Evolution of Codes and Labels
While company codes of conduct have been in force for more than fifteen years,
multi-stakeholder social code initiatives (MSIs) can be dated to 1996 and the Clinton
Administration's formation of the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP). Company codes of
conduct are essentially written documents that embody many or most of the ILO core
conventions on labor and incorporate better environmental and safety practices. They are
voluntary in the sense that local legislation and/or enforcement may not obligate this
behavior. The document becomes a commitment between the supplier and the company; 90
the supplier voluntarily agrees to behave according to the code and the company represents to
its customers and other interested parties that its vendors are behaving likewise. We italicize
voluntarily because most companies make acceptance of the code a precondition for
receiving future orders.
In a short period of time, company codes of conduct by themselves were difficult to
enforce. As we have seen previously, companies did not see any significant demand or
reason for immediate change. Resultantly they determined it was in their best interest to work
90 Social Accountability International and ITGLWF. (2006). "Codes of Conduct." Retrieved March 20, 2006,
from http://www.itglwf.org/pdf/CodesofConduct-pp33-42.pdf.
with the other stakeholders, as opposed to taking more definitive action on their own, to
accomplish the objective of improved working conditions; "According to Sean Ansett, Senior
Manager for Global Partnerships for Gap Inc, his company has learned through the process
of trying to go it alone on implementing its code how important collaboration among
companies and with stakeholders is in achieving effective implementation." 91 Effective
implementation in this context refers to ensuring codes are complied with, but it may also
mean that the Gap was still receiving negative publicity over its suppliers and found that
working with potential adversaries may have been a better business strategy.
Khalid Nadvi and Frank Waltring in a 2002 paper have traced the development of
social codes and placed them into five distinct generations. 92 Nadvi and Waltring have
diagrammed this evolution (Figure 1 following) with company codes as the origin and multi
stakeholder partnerships expanding only as consumer and NGO pressures increased. As we
have seen, there are not convincing arguments that consumer pressure was this strong but it is
reasonable to assume a company's perception of potential reputational risk is a valid
substitute for consumer pressure.93
91 Maquila Solidarity Network. (2003). "Codes Memo: Number 16." Retrieved March 20, 2006, from
http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/resources/codes/memo 16.htm.
92 Nadvi, K. and F. Waltring (2002). Making Sense of Global Standards. Duisberg, Gerhards-Mercator-
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Figure 1 Code Development as Pressure Increases
Figure 1 portrays well the Gap's thinking as well as many other developed country
buyers. As company codes became difficult to enforce for a variety of reasons, it was natural
that trade associations or industry groups would cooperate to set their own codes and
enforcement provisions. Nadvi and Waltring's five generations are delineated in Table 3
below 94 that shows sector codes as the next generation. Because legitimacy became a larger
issue, new generation of codes were developed, including the International Standards
Organization that developed environmental standards but stayed away from social standards.
When the Clinton Administration began to crack down on domestic labor problems
and NGOs and labor groups continued to expose overseas practices, companies moved
quickly to form multi stakeholder initiatives. These organizations, which are the major actors
today, have promulgated the fifth-generation codes highlighted by Nadvi and Waltring and
94 Ibid.
A
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are the primary ones that we will examine to determine their effectiveness; the exceptions
being 'Fair Trade' , which is listed as a fourth-generation code and the most recent
initiative-the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), put forth in 2003 by an
industry association, the Foreign Trade Association in Brussels that could be classified as
second-generation.
Brief History of the MSI Initiatives
To help in understanding the effectiveness of MSIs, we shall use the balance of this
chapter to describe a brief history of five MSI's, three American and two European. We shall
also look at joint efforts to start an information clearinghouse and to standardize the varying
codes. This history is critical because the founders and benefactors ultimately determine what
the desired outcome of the MSI is and what incentive structure gets set up to accomplish this
outcome.
Internal vs. External Monitoring
Much of what we shall see about the MSIs relates to monitoring. Internal monitoring
occurs when just single source codes of conduct are issued, for example a plant or a company
that issues a code will also use their own employees to monitor compliance. This happens
primarily in the developed world where regulation is enforced through government efforts.
Compliance penalties and/or potential litigation can be large and companies have a very high
incentive to ensure compliance. Companies use codes to set the bar higher than the law,
accomplishing hopefully two things: a positive goal, better performance, whether it is safety,
environmental etc. and a defensive goal, creating a precedent that can be utilized in case of
compliance failure that the company was using its best efforts. In the case of social codes
overseas, where there is no governmental enforcement and as the comment by the Gap points
out, internal monitoring quickly became problematic.
External monitoring uses third-party monitors and has its own source of problems.
These problems form a bigger part of the differences between MSIs and will be reflected in a
separate table along with governance, financing, budgets and other issues in the next section.
Dara O'Rourke outlines the issue, "These external monitoring systems differ in key
procedures for auditing (who conducts the monitoring and how), certification (whether a
factory or a brand is certified), and reporting (what is publicly disclosed)." 96
US Origin
Fair Labor Association (FLA)
The Fair Labor Association (FLA) is the oldest of the American initiatives and is the
only one that is the direct result of government involvement. Given the labor pressure on the
Clinton Administration on both the 'sweatshops overseas' issue and 'jobs at home' issue, the
administration convened the previously described Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) in
1996. The FLA's main purpose was to establish monitoring and verification standards for the
96 O'Rourke, D. (2003). "Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and
Monitoring." The Policy Studies Journal 31(1): 1-29.
codes of conduct approved by the AIP.97 Dara O'Rourke refers to the FLA as "both the
oldest and most controversial of current initiatives to establish monitoring and verification". 98
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the AIP, perhaps because it was convened
by a democratic administration, was unique because it involved so many diverse players.
However, the many goals of the participants could ultimately not be aligned and the FLA was
accused of following industry's lead and not paying enough attention to the demands of the
labor and inter-faith groups. 99
Andrew Ross writes about the AIP and the formation of the FLA, "Elaine Bernard,
director of Harvard's Trade Union Studies Program, suggested that the agreements merely
gave the 'good housekeeping seal of approval to a 'kinder, gentler' sweatshop.' The result
was an impasse that led to the withdrawal of the labor and interfaith groups from the
partnership. The AIP's monitoring arm, the FLA, was set up without their participation and
immediately garnered the reputation of being a corporate front"100
The FLA has responded to this criticism and has changed the way it monitors and
discloses information. Presently, it externally monitors five percent of its participating
companies' factories, publishes audit findings and remediation plans. 10' O'Rourke views the
FLA as advancing "market pressures by creating a supply chain policing system involving
97 Ross, A. (2004). Low pay, high profile : the global push for fair labor. New York, New Press : Distributed by
W.W. Norton.
98 O'Rourke, D. (2003). "Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and
Monitoring." The Policy Studies Journal 31(1): 1-29.
99 Ross, A. (2004). Low pay, high profile : the global push for fair labor. New York, New Press : Distributed by
W.W. Norton.
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multiple stakeholders. This advances a kind of 'collaborative regulation' or 'regulated
regulation' (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992102; Teubner, 1983103) that depends on top-level
commitment to the code from a brand or retailer, both internal and external monitoring of
suppliers, and participation of NGOs in providing legitimacy to the system."' 0 4 The FLA
presently has fifteen participating companies, including well-known brands such as Adidas-
Salomon, Nike, Patagonia, Nordstrom and Reebok which agree to implement the FLA
workplace code of conduct throughout their global supply chains. The FLA also has thirteen
'Category B' participants that agree to maintain FLA standards in factories that produce
products for FLA affiliated colleges and universities.'0 5
Worker Rights Consortium (WRC)
The Worker Rights Consortium was formed in April 2000, partially as a reaction to
the large industry involvement in the FLA'0 6. The USAS together with UNITE, the American
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and a variety of human
rights, labor and religious organizations wanted an initiative that would consider labor rights
102 Ayres, I. and J. Braithwaite (1992). Responsive Regulation: Transcending the deregulation debate. Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
103 Teubner, G. (1983). "Substantive and reflexive elements in modem law." Law and Society Review 17: 239-
285.
104 O'Rourke, D. (2003). "Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards
and Monitoring." The Policy Studies Journal 31(1): 1-29.
105 Fair Labor Association. (2006). "Participating Companies." Retrieved March 24, 2006, from
http://www.fairlabor.org/2005report/companies/participating/index.html.
106 Ross, A. (2004). Low pay, high profile : the global push for fair labor. New York, New Press : Distributed by
W.W. Norton.
before industry rights. The WRC has found most of its traction on university campuses and
essentially focuses on the collegiate licensing trade.
It was initially controversial because it mandated that all licensees must disclose
factory locations. This created significant dissension between licensor and manufacturer,
resulting in Nike canceling its contracts with Brown University and the University of
Michigan over the issue and Phil Knight withdrawing a $30 million gift to the University of
Oregon. 107
Unlike the FLA, the WRC has a bottoms-up approach. It encourages workers'
complaints and then uses local human right NGOs to investigate them. In this sense it hopes
to build worker entitlement and create confidence that workers can monitor their own
workplace.'l0 In the WRC's own words, "The WRC's independence is a crucial asset to the
organization and to affiliate colleges and universities. This independence allows the WRC to
get information from workers and worker advocates about factory conditions that other
monitors cannot obtain and to assist factories and licensees in communicating with workers
and their representatives to resolve problems and disputes; enhances the credibility of the
WRC's reports; and enables colleges and universities to report that their licensees' supply
chains are subject to investigative review by an organization that operates entirely
independently of the licensees."' 09
O'Rourke addresses the potential detractions of the WRC model, "Opponents have
accused the WRC of representing a 'gotcha' model of monitoring, more focused on
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Worker Rights Consortium. (2006). "How Does the WRC Relate to Licensee Corporations." Retrieved
March 24, 2006, from http://www.workersrights.org/about_faq.asp.
identifying problems and embarrassing firms than on resolving problems.""' 1 He views this
as "a 'fire alarm' model of regulation (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984111) that focuses on
creating new mechanisms of accountability for both firms and government agencies by
gathering information from workers and local organizations and then helping them organize
to win demands."' 12 Presently, the WRC has 152 affiliated colleges and universities.1 13
WRC Designated Suppliers Program
At the end of 2005, the WRC put forth a new program, the Designated Suppliers
Program (DSP), as the best way forward to enforce WRC's code of conduct. The DSP states
that DSP factories will operate at a higher level, "In addition to the respect for the standards
currently embodied in university codes of conduct, these factories will be required to meet
two additional standards: demonstrable respect for rights of association--as evidenced by the
presence of a legitimate, representative union or other representative employee body-and
the payment of a living wage."" 14
The DSP further mandates that licensees will source 25% of their production from
DSP factories the first year, 50% after two years and 75% after three years. At this point,
university members will decide whether there is more value in moving to 100% production in
DSP facilities or have some "production occurring outside of the sphere of the Designated
0o O'Rourke, D. (2003). "Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards
and Monitoring." The Policy Studies Journal 31(1): 1-29.
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Suppliers Program in order to maintain a broader influence on the apparel industry at
large." 15
The advent of the DSP has caused confusion among WRC members and provoked
criticism from other code initiatives. Based on concern from its members, the WRC board
issued a clarifying statement in January 2006, "To clarify, the WRC Board stated support for
the DSP as 'the most effective way forward to achieve sustainable compliance' and
'recommended' that affiliated colleges and universities adopt the program. This is a
recommendation; it is not a mandate or requirement for affiliation with the WRC."' 16
The FLA has also raised issues concerning the DSP's position on freedom of
association."1 7 In particular, an area of concern is China, where many of the licensed products
are produced and has inconsistent laws concerning freedom of association. As the FLA has a
large affiliated university program, this protest may be a strategic effort to lure new
members. However, some key members of the WRC, such as Duke University, where 200
students occupied the President's office in 1998, are happy with the direction of the DSP,
"Jim Wilkerson, Duke's director of trademark licensing, said the USAS proposal is 'feasible
and doable' and 'support is likely"'." 8
Social Accountability International (SAI)
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SAI is a successor organization to the Council on Economic Priorities Accreditation
Agency (CEPAA), which was founded in 1969. CEPAA created the SA 8000 code of
conduct in 1998 modeled after the ISO 9000 code used for ensuring standard quality control
practices. CEPAA changed its name in 2000 to SAI, reflecting the growing popularity of SA
8000.119
SA 8000, the code under which Devaraj is certified, is administered by a board made
up of labor, industry and NGOs. SA 8000 is a process-based system and is supposedly self-
selecting, though many companies mandate its use by suppliers. Like the ISO 9000, factories
are certified and not brands or companies. It requires that factories pay a 'living or basic
needs wage', a definition that is still the subject of much discussion. As evidenced by
Devaraj's decision, SAI hopes that factories will willingly choose to be certified in the hope
that developed world buyers will be attracted to them. 120
Like the other standards, SAI has its critics that state that an audit based on one day a
year visit is hardly comprehensive. 12 1Many member companies cite SA 8000 as an excellent
example because it is an enabling system; managers must take responsibility for their own
factories and by extensive training will build capacity among the staff. We shall discuss this
further in the next section.
O'Rourke calls SAI an example of 'privatized regulation', "These initiatives certify
that management systems are in place to guarantee acceptable performance in individual
factories...SAI tap into the motivations of individual factories seeking to connect into
119 NEIS Original Ink. (2001). "Who's Who in Codes of Conduct." Retrieved March 19, 2006, from
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socially concerned (and presumably high-value) buyers, as factories are audited only if they
ask (and pay) for the evaluation. These systems involve an advanced form of 'privatized
regulation' (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002122; Utting, 2002123)." ,124
SAI does not use NGOs to certify factories, but rather refers interested parties to
testing services such as those used for ISO certifications. These testing services, such as UL
or TUV, issue the certificates based on SAI's authorization. SAI claims that "SA8000 is
widely accepted as the most viable and comprehensive international ethical workplace
management system available." 125 SAI members include companies such as the GAP,
Chiquita Brands, and Timberland, labor unions that represent 15 million workers and NGO's
such as Amnesty International and CARE. Presently SAI has 710 certified factories in forty-
seven countries of which Italy accounts for 233 or 30% of the total. India is next with 104,
China 99 and Brazil 73. Theses four countries account for 72% of the total factory
certifications.126
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Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI)
A visit to ETI's offices close to the financial center of London can help illustrate the
tremendous leverage small organizations can exert. Founded in 1998 with government
funding, ETI presently has a budget of about $1.8 million, of which 40% is a UK government
grant and 60% is paid by members, consisting of companies, labor unions and NGOs.
The offices, located on the second floor of a small walk-up building in a pedestrian
way close to Gray's Inn are not something one would expect of an organization whose
members represent $180 billion in annual purchases. ETI has a 'base code' similar to the
other code issuing organizations (see Appendix I); expects its members to implement the
code along their supply chain but does not monitor, audit or certify their compliance.
Dan Rees, director of ETI, describes their mission as "developing good practices and
building capacity along the supply chain." 127 Similar to the GRI, members are expected
annually to report their compliance with the ETI base code, as well as their non-compliance
challenges. ETI puts on conferences and seminars where the stakeholders, including
suppliers in the developing countries attend, with the goal of furthering best practices. They
run pilot programs in partnership with their members in multiple countries and pass on the
results to their members. Unlike most of the other MSI's, they also work on problems in the
developed world. They were instrumental in getting legislation to license temporary labor
providers in the UK (what the British descriptively refer to as 'gangmasters'). 128
127 Rees, D. (2006). Interview with Dan Rees, Director ETI. London.
128 ETI (2004). Ethical Trade Initiative 2003/2004 Annual Report. London, Ethical Trade Initiative.
ETI prints an extensive library of reports and has commissioned a study into supply
chain conflicts that documents specific inconsistent practices of developed world buyers. 129
ETI has earned credibility with its various stakeholders because it is a learning and teaching
organization; it makes no representation that its member companies comply but implies that
there is a reasonable level of trust in their discussions with members to move an ethical
trading agenda along. They are instrumental in formulating joint standards, which will be
discussed later.
Critics find transparency lacking at ETI and contend that any non-compliance should
be reported to the general public and not to just member organizations. 130They also charge
that ETI will be left behind because of its lack of enforceable standards, "The strength of the
ETI's experimental "learning by doing" approach has been its ability to explore alternative
methods of monitoring and remediation at a time when there are no easy answers to the code
implementation dilemma. At the same time, ETI's seeming inability to move beyond the
learning stage could ultimately lead to self-regulation by better educated companies, in the
absence of any permanent institutional enforcement mechanisms."'31
Presently ETI has thirty seven corporate members including Inditex (Zara), the GAP,
Sainsbury's, Tesco and Marks and Spencer; its union members include the International
129 Acona (2004). Buying your way into trouble. London, Acona Limited
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Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation and International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions; its NGO members include Oxfam and Christian Aid.13 2
Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI)
BSCI is the most recent initiative for codes of conduct and as mentioned previously is
a reversion to a sector initiative. BSCI is not a tripartite (company, labor and NGO)
organization like SAI and ETI, nor a bipartite organization like FLA or the WRC; it is solely
an industry initiative. Its objective is to get member's suppliers up to SA 8000 standards or
equivalent 'best practice'.133 Auditing is done by SAI's accredited auditors.
BSCI has developed a database of suppliers and audit findings and shares this with its
members only. A BSCI member, Heinz-Dieter Koeppe comments on the expense of SAI
certification and the reason for BSCI, "The most important reason for creating BSCI was to
avoid multiple auditing and because we believe a sectoral approach is the only way to bring
about sustainability and rapid change."' 34
Critics of BSCI have commented on their industry focus and have pointed out that
industry is again afraid to deal with other stakeholders such as labor and NGOs. Dan Rees of
ETI thinks it is good that companies can share supplier data but is afraid that BSCI may
132 Ethical Trade Initiative. (2006). "Members of the Ethical Trading Initiative." Retrieved March 25, 2006,
from http://www.ethicaltrade.org/Z/abteti/who/memb/list.shtml#ngo.
133 BSCI. (2006). "Business Social Compliance Initiative--An Initiative of the Foreign Trade Association."
Retrieved March 25, 2006, from http://www.bsci-eu.org/content.php?page=BsciMonitoring.
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become the lowest common denominator for enforcing codes of conduct.135 Another
comment by Koeppe strengthens this fear, "as the name-Business Social Compliance
Initiative-indicates, we are business driven."' 36
Maquila Solidarity Network, a Canadian NGO which reports regularly on
developments in codes of conduct sums up BSCI, "In many respects, the BSCI represents a
step forward for large European retailers. It commits member companies to a common code
of conduct that is largely based on ILO conventions. It also facilitates sharing of information
on audit findings among retailers, thereby limiting duplication of factory audits. However,
the BSCI is clearly an industry-controlled, self-regulatory initiative, and one that offers little
access to information or influence to workers or other stakeholders."' 3 7 There are fifty-four
members of BSCI including most of the large European retailers, such as Otto, Inditex, C &
A, Karstadt and de Bijenkorf.'38 It is noticeable for its lack of large French retailers.
Information Clearinghouses
Fair Factories Clearinghouse (FFC)
Reebok, in conjunction with the trade group, the National Retail Federation, and large
department stores such as Federated Merchandising Group and the Hudson Bay Company,
135 Rees, D. (2006). Interview with Dan Rees, Director ETI. London.
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have formed the FFC to act as a clearinghouse for social audit information. 139 It is similar to
the industry movement that formed BSCI in the sense that retailers and brands were
frustrated by the duplication of efforts to audit factories. Like BSCI, information sharing is
entirely voluntary and no proprietary information will be released to the general public.
According to the FFC, "The objectives of the FFC are to:
* Improve the availability, comprehensiveness and standardization of factory social
compliance audits through the use of a global data management system to track
workplace conditions.
* Facilitate the exchange of information concerning factory social compliance audits
from internal and external reports without requiring adherence to a particular social
compliance audit standard.
* Eliminate the duplication of audits through the sharing of social compliance
information.
* Advance and promote education and knowledge about the current status of workplace
conditions and steps that companies can take to improve workplace conditions." 140
The FFC aims to accomplish its objectives in two phases; phase one will allow
companies to use the FFC database software to monitor their compliance activities and
phase two will allow for the voluntary sharing of proprietary information. A benefit of
139 Fair Factories Clearinghouse. (2006). "Governance." Retrieved March 26, 2006, from
http://www.fairfactories.org/governance.htm.
140 Fair Factories Clearinghouse. (2006). "About." Retrieved March 26, 2006, from
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the clearinghouse is to allow companies to find better conforming suppliers and to notify
other participants of compliance issues with existing suppliers.
Initiatives to Social Code Standardization
Joint Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Workers' Rights (Jo-In)
As companies continue to take their own efforts to share information, the MSIs have
also moved to do the same. In the spring of 2003, the ETI joined with three other previously
described MSIs, the FLA, SAI and the WRC along with two other European MSIs, the Clean
Clothes Consortium (CCC) and Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) to form the 'Joint Initiative on
Corporate Accountability and Workers' Rights' or 'Jo-In'.
The members of Jo-In reached a consensus on a common code of labor practice in
2005 that will be used in pilot project in Turkey.141 The draft Jo-In code along with the other
MSI positions is presented as a table in Appendix I. The objective of the trial project,
according to Jo-In is:
1. "To maximize the effectiveness and the impact of the multi-stakeholder organizations
by ensuring that resources are directed as efficiently as possible to improving the
lives of workers and their families.
2. To explore possibilities for closer cooperation between the multi-stakeholder
organizations and ensure that resources are directed as efficiently as possible through
shared learning.
141 Maquila Solidarity Network. (2005). "Codes Memo: Number 19." Retrieved March 20, 2006, from
http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/resources/codes/pdf/codesmemol9.pdf.
3. To assess in what manner voluntary codes of labour practice and various approaches
to their implementation can best contribute to better workplace conditions."'
142
The biggest challenge facing Jo-In is reconciling the various approaches each MSI has to
actually implementing the codes of conduct. The ETI has been instrumental in getting Jo-In
this far because it is viewed as a learning organization; the challenges are ahead as
implementation is actually the heart of the matter.
142 Joint Initiative on Corporate Accountability and Workers' Rights (2005). Project Design, Joint Initiative on
Corporate Accountability and Workers' Rights: 1-8.
Chapter Four--Efficacy and Incentives of Codes and Labels
Devaraj and SA 8000
Before we look at the efficacy of the multi-stakeholder initiatives, let us return to
Devaraj and his decision to become SA 8000 certified. As we have seen in the design of SA
8000, it is very similar to the process for the ISO quality certifications. Devaraj had received
his ISO 9001 in 1999 and ISO 14001 in 2002; he believed it was a logical step to apply for
the SA 8000 certification. He used the same certification body as he did for the quality
certifications and it took him eight months to be certified receiving his SA 8000 in 2003.
As we had previously mentioned, Devaraj believed that the SA 8000 would allow him
to appear credible in the eyes of potential American and European buyers; he did not believe
it would make a difference to his existing customers. He has been monitored for social codes
by his existing buyers since 2000 and by 3 different firms; all related to the buyers' agents in
India. He has not had any compliance issues. As part of his SA 8000 certification, he did
have to make one concession; he placed an additional 2% of his direct employees pay into a
Provident Fund to meet the SA 8000 'basic need' standard.
To diversify his dependence on fiber and labor from Kerala, Devaraj opened a facility
in the adjoining state of Tamil Nadu. He primarily makes geo-textiles for his Japanese
customer here and the facility is not SA 8000 certified. Yet he has excellent labor relations,
his employees are paid a living wage and he believes he produces better products in his
Tamil factory. He ascribes most of this success to his relationship with his Japanese
customer. Moreover, he contrasts this relationship with those of his Western customers that
demand SA 8000 certification in his Kerala plant.
In his geo-textile business, Devaraj has what he calls a "mutual dependency"
relationship with his supplier.143 He is the Japanese company's major supplier who is trusted
with the buyer's intellectual property and in turn he agrees to not sell another Japanese
importer. He licenses all the Japanese patents at no cost and the Japanese regularly train his
employees spending weeks if necessary. The Japanese test all of his products; paying for
their cost and sharing all of the test reports without threatening to take away the business.
Devaraj has a three year exclusive contract with the Japanese buyer. Based on this, he
expands his plant, trains his workers, invests in new equipment and develops new products
knowing that he has an economic reason to do so. The Japanese pay him when he ships his
merchandise and have offered to help finance development efforts. He receives constant sales
updates from his buyer and while they are not real-time, they are sufficient for Devaraj to
plan his workload and raw material purchasing appropriately. He feels comfortably asking
for projections and knows that his buyer will inform him if sales projections vary.
Contrasted with the Japanese company, Devaraj states his Western buyers offer no
contract, no sales information, no exclusivity and short-notice order changes. Devaraj states
that he uses his own employees in Tamil Nadu for the Japanese customer because he can plan
his production schedule. In Kerala, he uses the cottage markets as much as he can to meet the
demands of his SA 8000-requiring customers. He prefers not to do this and while he states it
143 Devaraj (2006). Personal Interviews With Devaraj, Jan-Feb 2006. Hannover, Boston.
is not to avoid audits, he does say that the SA 8000 auditors let him pick two out of the fifty
subcontractors he uses for its audit purposes. 144
Devaraj views his Japanese buyers as a partner and his European and American
buyers as customers. The Japanese buyers work hard to build trust; the others work equally
hard to create uncertainty. In Devaraj's mind, his goal is to minimize uncertainty. Having a
business in a developing country creates enough uncertainty; he doesn't want more from his
customers. Absent the 2% pay to the Provident fund, he feels his uncertified Tamil plant
employees perform as well, if not better than his certified Kerala ones and are perhaps even
happier. He further states that if he could have the same kind of transparency he has with his
Japanese buyer, he would be happy to install a profit-sharing plan or higher compensation in
Kerala, in place of SA 8000 requirements. 14 5
How effective are Codes and Labels?
Based on Devaraj's example, it is easy to say that the social codes may not be as
effective as desired. Yet, the multi-stakeholder initiatives have helped to make codes of
conduct a significant issue in the sourcing community. Certainly, thousands of workers have
improved their lives because of the work of the MSIs. The challenge in this area is that much
of the data is anecdotal, like Devaraj's. There is no methodology and no significant research
that quantitatively documents the success of MSIs.
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Given the lack of clear data, one way to examine the effectiveness of the MSIs is to
judge by what the stakeholders are saying. Neil Keamey, General Secretary of the ITGLWF,
in a 2003 speech, states, "A decade later and the situation has been transformed. A recent
report suggested that there are now more than 10,000 corporate codes of conduct in
existence. Some are good, the vast majority not worth the paper they are written on.
Manufacturers, retailers, brand names, almost every type of enterprise have scrambled to put
in place an umbrella of security in the form of a corporate code of conduct. A great many of
these are general in nature and meaningless in practice, in reality a public relations exercise
and very frequently a fig leaf for continued exploitation...The use of corporate codes of
conduct, including multi-stakeholder codes is often haphazard and half-hearted. Far too many
companies appear to see codes merely as a test that has to be passed. Thus all effort goes into
convincing the auditors to issue a certificate and these efforts exhaust the company's ability
to continue improvement after the certificate has been granted. True, there probably have
been some improvements in the application of health and safety standards and there well may
have been a reduction in child labor in certified plants." 146
Kearney continues, addressing specifically the issue of effectiveness, "In reality,
nearly a decade of work in applying corporate codes of conduct has produced very limited
improvements in working conditions in the textile, clothing and footwear industries. This
must pose the question as to whether the effort being expended on voluntary initiatives is
worthwhile and whether the emphasis should now switch elsewhere." 147
146 Kearney, N. (2003). Codes of Conduct: Clean-up or Cover-up? International Conference on European Social
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Johannes Merck, Vice-President of the $18 Billion Otto Group, in a talk to the SAI
2005 conference addresses the same issue, "Having one's own internal monitoring system is
fine. However, it's not especially effective either...As a result we had suppliers reporting that
they had to deal with more than 50 audits a year-audits that their customers-in other
words companies like Otto-had carried out. Just imagine the amount of time and money
that was wasted--quite apart from the loss of goodwill...Audits create transparency.
However, they change little...Unfortunately, even though we have successfully combined
our buying potential, we frequently find that many suppliers do not really work at
implementing the corrective action plans between audits. Average improvement rates of 30%
are clearly insufficient. Without expert support, smaller businesses in particular are often
unable to meet the requirements at all..."' 48 Merck, in the same speech, did discuss how
working with SAI increased "social compliance" to 65% of suppliers upon re-audit. These
results highlight the challenges of codes--65% compliance after training and upon a one day
audit; like most of the data, it is sparse and there is no mention of duration, improved
productivity, higher profitability or most measures one would expect from improved labor
conditions.
Finally, reinforcing the tensions inherent in 'voluntary multi-stakeholder initiatives',
Merck states, "For this reason, we will need more cooperation. In this regard, I would make
the following point. It would be helpful if the NGOs would target above all those who do
nothing at all in the field of social standards or 'free riders'. A company such as Otto and
many others are represented here today needs critical voices. This is absolutely clear! But we
148 Merck, J. (2005). Speech at SAI Conference. Social Accountability International September 2005
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also need positive support from the public." 149 It appears that Otto would like other drivers to
facilitate social standards, such as consumers, but is also getting tired of the NGOs pointing
out their shortcomings.
The Financial Times in a November 2005 article sees it the same way--companies
must preserve their reputation, "Faced with increasingly complex risks in their global supply
chains, some of the world's largest companies are seeking strength in numbers. Industries
from electronics to chocolate-making and toys to jewellery are learning to collaborate on
labour and environmental standards, hoping to minimize the risks to their reputation. 'There
is safety in numbers', says David Logan, a consultant who has advised Gap, Marks and
Spencer, Cadbury Schweppes and other companies on child labour issues and socially
responsible sourcing. 'It deflects the attacks on singular brands. By pooling experience,
companies start to get on the front foot instead of being on the back foot"'
150
After ten years of work, there is still a large learning curve going on with MSIs and
much of it, from the companies' perspective is still based on limiting risk. Why are
companies like Otto not getting the credit they seek for their efforts? Is there a point when
companies will no longer worry about their reputation and what is it?
On the first question, Alex Nicholls and Charlotte Opal answer it indirectly by talking
about the challenges Nike faces, "Indeed a lack of power and information has been a
common defence in corporate supply chain scandals: Nike's main defence when exposed as a
buyer of sweatshop-produced goods was that this criticism be directed at the manufacturers
149 Ibid.
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of the goods rather than Nike as the corporate buyer. The fact that consumers remained
unimpressed by such an argument is significant as it rests on a perception ofNike's power
and information very different from that presented by the company itself."' 51 As we have
seen, consumers are more likely to penalize companies than reward them. The information
and transparency Nicholls and Opal refer to are the same transparency arguments MSIs are
grappling with today. Yet, will there ever be enough information or is that a false goal?
Peter Utting of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
(UNRISD), in addressing the role of MSIs at a speech at a conference in Brussels in
November 2005, talks to the additional problems of scale and legitimacy. On scale, he shows
the following table and states that, "The fourth problem (sic) relates to scale. There is so
much talk about CSR that we sometimes get the impression that most of the business or
corporate community is participating actively in this agenda. This is far from being the case.
When looking at the figures, we need to bear in mind that there are about 70,000 TNCs,
700,000 TNC affiliates, and millions of small and medium sized enterprises supplying TNCs
and large northern retailers.
Approximately 4,000-5,000 companies are thought to produce company reports.
About 700 companies claim to use some of the GRI guidelines, and only 68 claim to use
them systematically. By far the largest certification initiative in the CSR arena, ISO 14001
certification for environmental management, has been adopted by 90,000 entities. SA8000
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certification related to labour standards has been adopted by 700. Other data are provided in
the table."' 52
Table 4 Utting--Number of Companies Utilizing MSI Codes
TOTAL TNCs = 69,727 TNC AFFILIATES = 690,391 a
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a. UNCTAD World Investment Report 2005.
b. In the garments industry alone, there are estimated to be 250,000 export factories
worldwide (AccountAbility et al., 2005).
c. Refers to certified entities, some of which may not be companies.
d. This category implies a higher level of commitment to the initiative's norms and
guidelines.
e. Refers to participating companies, of which 98 are in Fortune's Global 500.
f. Forest management and chain of custody certificates.
g. Certified fisheries. Another 17 fisheries are currently undergoing full assessment
and 40 are engaged in the programme.
h. Partnerships registered on the CSD Database.
i. Refers to facilities.
j. Also includes the Ethical Tea Partnership, an association that comprises 18 tea
packers.
Source: Peter Utting' 53
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On Merck's second question, he surmises that even if the MSIs are successful, it
raises a whole different issue, "This brings us to the question of the legitimacy of non-
governmental organizations or multi-stakeholder initiatives which may marginalize the
participation of certain stakeholders, not only from developing countries but also trade
unions, in their decision-making and governance structures; and that, unlike trade unions, do
not have a membership base. There is also the concern that largely unaccountable non-
governmental or private organizations are encroaching in the public arena of standard setting
and governance."' 54
Perhaps Merck should be asking different questions. Voluntary initiatives occur
because there is a perceived void in society. In the case of social codes, the void is clear lack
of legislation, regulation and enforcement that exist in developing countries. O'Rourke refers
to "outsourcing regulation". 155 Would Merck be better off asking when will countries take
responsibility for regulating and enforcing working conditions or 'insourcing regulation'?
Can voluntary social codes and their sponsor be termed successful once this occurs?
Certainly, MSIs should be proud of all they have accomplished. Yet companies need
to ask themselves if there is something else they should be doing in addition to the work of
the MSIs that will bring regulation back to where it belongs. We argue that there is and that
companies need to be doing more, not only because it will help improve labor conditions, but
more importantly, because their business models will be threatened by the changes we
referred to in Chapter One. Business has a unique opportunity to do good by doing well, as
opposed to the proverbial 'doing well by doing good'. We shall begin to examine this
154 Ibid.
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opportunity by looking at the incentives set up under the MSIs. However first, we will have a
brief look at another voluntary initiative, Fair Trade, so that we can compare their incentives
with the social code MSIs.
'Fair Trade' and Market Access
As we have seen so far, all of the multi-stakeholder initiatives are voluntary; in the
absence of governmental regulation and enforcement, consumer demand, investors' interest
and companies' direct and specific actions, MSIs are serving to help impose positive change
upon the workplace. Fair Trade is one initiative with a similar objective that can make a
legitimate claim to being consumer-led and hence market driven.
We had originally considered examining other initiatives, particularly sustainability
ones such as the Forest Stewardship Council and the Marine Stewardship Council, which
also work through labeling and consumer demand. However, we found that the Fair Trade
movement may be more comparable in the sense that in addition to market access and profit
appropriation issues, it works to build capacity in developing countries.
Fair Trade started as a movement to help Eastern European economies recover from
the devastating effects of World War II. The Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam)
was originally set up in 1942 to help get food and medical supplies through blockades in
Greece. After the war was over, Oxfam "enlarged its objectives to include the 'relief of
suffering in consequence of the war '"" 56 During the 1960's, Oxfam expanded their operating
territory to include developing countries. During this period Oxfam opened retail shops
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throughout the United Kingdom that were staffed by volunteers and sold handicrafts from
projects they were funding in the developing countries. Presently Oxfam has 750 retail shops
staffed by 22,000 volunteers in the UK.' 57
In 1991, Oxfam founded Caf6Direct, a coffee importer that bought directly from
small producers and co-operatives and in 1992 helped set up the Fairtrade Foundation, which
controls the use of the 'Fair Trade' mark in the UK.' 58 Though Oxfam had a much higher
profile, the Fair Trade mark was actually created in 1988 by the Max Havelaar Foundation, a
Dutch organization that championed the rights of Javanese coffee farmers. 159
Contrary to the social code initiatives, Fair Trade is based on labeling. There are still
multiple Fair Trade organizations, though the most widely known and accepted is the Fair
Trade Labeling Organization (FLO) which pools certification and marketing resources for
the developed world. TransFair USA is the US member of the FLO and monitors US
importers, manufacturers and distributors.'16 Interestingly, Fair Trade has moved away from
its handicrafts and textile roots and into the commodities trade. Mainly, this is because the
FLO has been unable to certify its 'fair trade' origins and given its limited resources, it has
chosen industries that are easier to certify. 16 1
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As stated by Alex Nicholls and Charlotte Opal, "Fair Trade has three interlinked
aims: to alleviate extreme poverty through trade; to empower smallholder farmers and farm
workers to use trade relationships as a means of enhancing their social capital, and to support
the wider campaign for global trade reform and trade justice. Crucially, Fair Trade addresses
these objectives through a market-driven commercial model, rather than by charity or a
developmental aid mechanism. This approach is ultimately more sustainable and empowers
producers to develop livelihoods that avoid dependency." 162
Fair Trade hopes to accomplish these objectives through four "basic principles:
* Direct purchasing from producers
* Transparent and long-term trading partnerships
* Agreed minimum prices
* Focus on development and technical assistance via the payment to suppliers of an
agreed social premium" 163
A big component of Fair Trade's business model is disintermediation; in essence it seeks
to cut out the middleman. In the case of most commodities, this is the local
wholesaler/exporter that buys from the small plantations and then exports the product
overseas. Fair Trade recognizes that small producers face such challenges as market access,
market information including pricing and quality, access to credits and financial markets,
weak domestic institutions and high switching costs in the face of poor market information.
They encourage producers that are not capable of standing alone to join or form cooperatives.
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Once a producer cooperative or estate is chosen, Fair Trade importers are obligated to
encourage the economic growth of the producer in three ways: they should enter into a
contract of at least 6 moths to a year, agree to pay a 'floor price' for the commodity where
the floor price is defined as the cost of production + cost of living + cost of complying with
Fair Trade standards or market price (whichever is higher); finally importers must also pay a
'social premium' on top of the floor or market price. The social premium is to be spent by the
grower community on social development projects. 164 Fair Trade importers also may pay for
products ahead of shipment, if requested to by the growers.
Critics contend that the Fair Trade movement is getting appropriated by the large
retailers. Supermarkets such as Tesco and Whole Foods and specialists like Starbuck's sell a
large amount of Fair Trade product at a significant price premium. While they pay producers
the floor price, they do not share any of the price premiums they receive. Supporters contend
that this is okay because the producers are benefiting, but the ethical specialists that
supported the growth of the Fair Trade movement are beginning to feel marginalized and are
pushing for Fair Trade remaining with smaller retailers.
Fair Trade products have enjoyed reasonable market acceptance. Sales of all Fair
Trade labeled products reached $900M in 2003 and are projected to reach $1.8B in 2007.165
What is the Incentive Design?
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In the following section, we will examine the incentives that these voluntary
initiatives create. We will accomplish this with the help of a series of five tables. Table 5
gives an overview of the initiatives; it covers the main institutional areas that can be
indicative of the MSIs incentive setup. Tables 6, 7 and 8 examine the incentives as they relate
to different components of the MSIs' social codes and how these incentives affect the buyer-
supplier relationship. Table 9 shows how the present incentive structure reinforces the
tensions we identified in the first chapter.
In the next chapter, we will use this information to show that though the MSIs are
well intended, they do not create enough incentives to be successful in achieving their
desired results. Finally we will conclude with what needs to change in order to have a better
outcome.
MSI's and Institutional Structure
Table 5 highlights that all of these organizations work with extremely limited
budgets. It is to their credit that they are able to have the impact they do. The small budgets
alone signify the low level of interest the industry players have. Taken as a total and
discounting for government grants and BSCI, for which we have no figures, the total annual
industry investment in the code organizations is $4.6M. Certainly these investments are
magnified by industry's own investment in 3 rd party monitoring and self-monitoring, yet they
are still extremely small.
Though they have representation on the boards, there is no senior management
represented among the members. The industry representatives generally have titles such as
social compliance manger or vice-president, social responsibility. Given the potential
modeling effects these organizations could have, these two areas alone show that industry's
priority is not necessarily here.
Table 5 MSIs' Institutional Structures
Fair Trade
FLA SAI WRC ETI BSCI (FLO)
Governance 16 member 7 member 15 member 10 member N/A but 11 member
board board board board, assumed to board consisting
consisting consisting consisting consisting of be industry of 5 Fair Trade
of 6 of I of 5 3 industry and trade labeling
industry counsel, I university reps, 3 associations organizations, 4
reps, 6 staff, 1 reps, 5 labor, 3 that form producers, 1
NGOs, 3 member of independent NGO reps FTA NGO and 1
university advisory labor and 1 industry
reps, I board, 2 experts, 5 independent
independent NGOs and 2 USAS reps chair
chairperson independent
Budget and 2004-$1.8M 2004-$2.1M 2004-$950K 2004-$1.8M N/A 2004- $2.1M of
Financing ($) of which of which of which of which which $1.1 from
$1.4M $1.1M $550K $800K from labeling orgs and
member service government UK $1.1M from
fees and revenue, grants and government external grants
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Disincentives Lose Lose Lose Lose Lose Lose business
to Supplier business business business business business
Incentive to Better Better Better Better Better Better working
Labor working working working working working conditions along
conditions conditions conditions conditions conditions ILO code, higher
along ILO along ILO along ILO along ILO along ILO wages, training,
code code, living code code code social premium
wage, some for community
training
Disincentives Creates Creates Creates Creates Creates None
to Labor tension with tension with tension with tension with tension with
employer, employer, employer, employer, employer,
because of because of because of because of because of
high stakes high stakes high stakes high stakes high stakes
Measure of % of Number of Number of None, None Sales
Effectiveness factories certification factories on learning
complying holders DSP list organization
with audit
Transparency Restricted Restricted Public Public Restricted Public/Restricted
Sources: Organizational Websites, Dara O'Rourke'" ' , Nicholls et al 6 7
166 O'Rourke, D. (2003). "Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards
and Monitoring." The Policy Studies Journal 31(1): 1-29.
167 Nicholls, A. and C. Opal (2005). Fair Trade: Market Driven Ethical Consumption. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage
Publications.
Like many non-profits, most of the incentives can be traced to their funding sources
and even the WRC, with no industry funding, is still subject to the direction of its university
benefactors, witnessed by the clarification of DSP responsibilities. Likewise, given that the
objective of all of the codes, with the exception of ETI, is compliance, the only reward is to
the industry benefactors, namely reducing their own reputational risk. Though most code
organizations are moving towards capacity building, there is no inherent reward structure
built into the code compliance structure for suppliers. The only disincentive is to the supplier,
which is loss of business. Again, the industry has no disincentive and even in the face of
adverse publicity can claim that they are using best efforts as demonstrated by their
commitment to their respective MSI.
Incentive Alignment in Three Areas
Business-Model Design
Knowing that the MSI structure reinforces the benefactor's goals, we should look
next at how most of theses companies operate. With the exception of Inditex, almost all of
the MSI industry members have business models that revolve around low fixed asset or no
fixed asset investment in supply chain operations. They can be seen as investing in their core
competency of brand management, and/or retailing and outsourcing everything else. 168
168 Walters, D., M. Halliday, et al. (2002). "Added value, enterprise value and competitive advantage."
Management Decision 40(9): 823-833.
Conceptually, this is about flexibility and certainly the MFA regime encouraged this
behavior.
Given the changing landscape, it still appears at least through the lens of the MSIs
that the outsourcing relationship is very traditional. As part of compliance with the codes
there is no added incentive in terms of investment, preferential terms or better financing.
Much of this may be because such relationships are vested in the supplier-buyer discussions
and not public information. However, very little data exists and certainly the code
organizations are not holding any rewards out to its supplier base for code compliance.
A key part of this model does favor the MSIs and that is organizations with a large
investment in brands have large risk of reputational loss. Yet given the cooperative nature of
the MSIs, they have helped foster the mitigation value that industry feels comfortable with.
As stated previously, in the absence of general consumer interest and limited investor
activity, industry has calculated the value of reputational risk and invested accordingly to
reduce or eliminate it. Certainly, as evidenced by the table below, there are no rewards
inherent in MSI structure that would signify willingness on behalf of industry to change their
business model over the issue of social standards.
Fair Trade, by definition, is an exception to this and this is one reason why it is
included in this survey. Fair Trade is all about business model change and the reward
structure indicates how it intends to achieve this goal. Even with equity investment, Fair
Trade encourages a different model; in this case it facilitates the investment of growing
cooperatives in upstream marketing companies, such Day Chocolate Company. 169
169 Nicholls, A. and C. Opal (2005). Fair Trade: Market Driven Ethical Consumption. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage
Publications.
Table 6 Incentives Created by Compliance that reinforce or Might Change Business Model
If Supplier Complies, Fair Trade
The Following FLA SAI WRC ETI BSCI (FLO)
Rewards Are Offered
Long Term Contract None None None None None Yes
Pricing Premium None None None None None Yes
Equity Investment None None None None None Some,
usually
upwards
Advance Payment None None None None None Yes
Preferential Supplier None None None, with None None Yes
DSP potential,
yes
Exclusivities None None None None None Yes
Training None None None None None Yes
Expansion None None None None None Yes
Opportunities
Access to Senior None None None None None Yes
Management
The Spanish retailer, Inditex, which is sometimes better known by the name of its major
subsidiary, Zara, is another example of a different business model. Perhaps because it started
as a manufacturer, Zara manufactures 50% of its products in its own factories. It uses a small
pool of outside suppliers, 400, to supply its other needs.170 Its relationships with this pool
vary greatly. For 40% of its fabrics, which is traditionally a bottleneck in apparel production,
Zara buys from an Inditex-owned subsidiary. For dyestuff, Zara buys from a part-owned
producer accounting for 20% of the producers business. Zara buys the rest of its fabric from
the supplier pool, but accounts for no more than 4% of sales at any single vendor. This
allows Zara to marry flexibility with price. 171
We shall talk about Zara more in the next chapter, but it serves as another
counterpoint when examining Table 6.
170 Ferdows, K., M. Lewis, et al. (2003). "Zara." Supply Chain Forum 4(2): 62-67.
171 Ibid.
Supply Chain Considerations
Based on the business model that most of the code partners utilize, supply chain
considerations play a great role. In this regard, the MSIs offer no incentives or differentiation
along the supply chain. Again this information may be embedded in the buyer-seller
relationship but it is certainly not a part of the incentive system offered by anybody other
than Fair Trade. While there is a growing movement among MSIs to address buyer issues,
such as ETI's initiative with a commissioned study on buying practices; 172buyers behavior
and its corresponding effect are not addressed as part of compliance issues. This makes sense
given that the buyers are funding the MSIs. Certain buyers are beginning to re-examine their
practices but this is a new area.
Most of the proponents of the outsourcing model have focused on the claims to
efficiency. Hau Lee refutes this conventional wisdom, "As time went by, I observed one
fundamental problem that most companies and experts seemed to ignore: Ceteris paribus,
companies whose supply chains became more efficient and cost-effective didn't gain a
sustainable advantage over their rivals. In fact the performance of those supply chains
steadily deteriorated. For instance, despite the increased efficiency of many companies'
supply chains, the percentage of products that were marked down in the United States rose
172 Acona (2004). Buying your way into trouble. London, Acona Limited
Insight Investment: 1-38.
from less than 10% in 1980 to more than 30% in 2000, and surveys show that consumer
satisfaction with product availability fell sharply during the same period." 173
Lee places supply chains in four different categories: efficient supply chains, risk-
hedging supply chains, responsive supply chains and agile supply chains 74
Demand Uncertainty








Figure 2 Supply Chain Demand/Process Matrix (Source: Lee175)
Lee states that different products require different supply chain structures. If we were
to overlay some of the products that that are purchased by the industry members of the MSI,
the matrix would look like the following:
173 Lee, H. (2004). "The Triple -A Supply Chain." Harvard Business Review(October 2004): 102-112.



























Figure 3 Demand/Process Matrix with Code-Related Products
For example, products such as basic apparel and shoes will benefit from efficient
supply chains that will take advantage of scale, optimization techniques and have constant
information flowing in both directions.176 Generally these facilities would be modem and
somewhat capital intensive. Products such as seasonal food and natural products dependent
upon growing seasons should have risk-sharing built in with perhaps inventory pooling or
guaranteed safety stocks to stabilize supply. Fashion products require mass-customization
techniques and flexible manufacturing cells. Performance products require the best attributes
of the two previous structures. 177 Lee demonstrates that each of these structures requires
different strategies that have three goals in mind, agility, adaptability and alignment'7 8 .
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.







Table 7 Incentives along the Supply Chain Created by Code Compliance
If Supplier Complies, The Fair Trade
Following Rewards Are Offered FLA SAI WRC ETI BSCI (FLO)
Information-Sharing
Forecasting None None None None None Yes
Delivery Dates None None None None None Yes
Desired Inventory None None None None None None
Point of Sale Data None None None None None Yes
Seasonal Demand None None None None None Yes
Regional Demand None None None None None None
Promotional Events None None None None None None
Scheduling Changes None None None None None Yes
Inventory Holding Costs None None None None None Yes
Joint Decision Making
Consultation on Pricing None None None None None Yes
Product Mix None None None None None Yes
Optimal Order Quantity None None None None None Yes
Availability Level None None None None None Yes
Resolution of Order Exceptions None None None None None Yes
Inventory Levels None None None None None Yes
Promotional Events None None None None None None
Incentives Are Shared On
Reduced Inventory Costs None None None None None None
Delivery Guarantees for Peaks None None None None None Yes
Allowance for Defects None None None None None None
Training Costs None None None None None Yes
Markdowns/Advertising None None None None None None
Order Changes None None None None None Yes
Getting to this point requires tremendous collaboration along the supply chain.
Simatupang and Sridharan have tried to find ways to measure these efforts that might result
in a meaningful collaboration index. 179 Though we will not use the index, we will utilize the
methodology; the authors break down collaboration into three components: information
sharing, decision synchronization or joint decision making and incentive alignment.' 80All of
these areas then break down into specific questions about particular strategies. We have used
179 Simatupang, T. and R. Sridharan (2005). "The collaboration index: a measure for supply chain
collaboration." International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 35(1): 44-62.
180 Ibid.
their specific areas as a basis to see if the MSI codes encourage or create rewards for any
discussion in these areas. The results are reflected in table 7.
Capital Market Development
Compliance with codes also offers the supplier little capital development
opportunities. While again there may be financial investment between buyers and sellers, it is
certainly not stated as a benefit of compliance. The MSIs' efforts to encourage transparency
in the case of compliance issues are a start, but it does not spill over into financial
transparency. SAI encourages managers to take the lead in SA 8000 compliance but the
internal incentives within the company may be skewed to push the manager to cover-up.
Financial transparency helps build systems that encourage capital development.
Given the poor credit markets in most developing countries, access to developed
country financing can have a significant impact for suppliers. John McMillan and
Christopher Woodruff discuss one of the limitations of a developing countries' firm's
growth, "...although firms can for a while grow incrementally by investing their retained
earnings, they reach a point where, to take advantage of economies of scale, they must make
big discrete jumps in their investments. Having a long delayed return, such investments are
unlikely to be made on the basis of ongoing relationships."'8 1
Equity investment can encourage long term expansion and productivity
improvements. Certainly, by not encouraging transparency, buyers will rarely find the
'j" McMillan, J. and C. Woodruff (2002). "The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies."
Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(3): 153-170.
transparency they desire if they were to consider a stronger financial relationship with their
supplier.
Table 8 Incentives to Help Capital Development Created by Code Compliance
If Supplier Fair Trade





Encourage None None None None None Yes
Financial
Transparency
Equity None None None None None Yes
Investment
Opportunities
Preferred None None None None None Yes
Stock
Options in None None None None None Yes
Buyers Stock
Financial None None None None None Yes
Advice




Participation None None None None None Yes
in Debt
Offering




Created by MSIs Unintentionally Reinforce Globalization
As we can see from the above tables, successful compliance with the social codes
does not bring great rewards to suppliers other than the right to retain or bid for new
business. This is very much a top-down model that developed country businesses have tried
to move away from with their own domestic suppliers. While this paper does not examine
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how industry treats developed country suppliers, it would not be difficult to conclude that
some of the wrong incentives are set up in these relationships also.
Table 9 Global Trends & Tensions Reinforced by Social Codes
Globalization Trend Tensions Created Social Codes Reinforce or Reduce
Tension
Industrialization, De- Rapid development in the South favors Social Codes reinforce tension as
Industrialization and virtuous cycle there. Developed countries' suppliers question integrity of buyer
the Virtuous Circle economies and social structure under attack demands without adequate rewards.
as jobs leave. Expectations of social support Codes come across as patronizing with
diminish as affected companies and countries monitoring and enforcement provisions.
cut pension plans, health and other benefits.
Northern labor becomes suspicious of
South's intent
Manufactures, Tariffs Increased levels of outsourcing improve Same as above, with standards
and Protectionism manufacturing skill base in South. Job losses reinforcing notion of higher costs. No
grow and skill base in North evaporates. capacity building, efforts to foster
eveloping countries use selective consolidation or cooperation,
protectionist measures to encourage faster investment, technology transfer,
growth while developed countries try to force training lead reinforce notion of
high-cost standards onto developing ones exploitation.
GATT, MFA and Distorted incentives have created intense Same as above with companies
China's Entry into the competition among countries. Developing choosing to play countries against one
WTO countries will try to keep low cost of labor as another to keep costs low. No
a comparative advantage and choose to investment in training, infrastructure to
overlook labor and social issues. Threat of no give country confidence in building
quotas on Chinese goods reinforces previous institutions (Cambodia may be
issue. Labor in developed countries look for exception with US/ILO project)
Chinese dumping practices fostering more
mistrust
Capital Market Developing capital markets allow for rapid No investment or long term contracts
Development capital inflows and outflows prompting encourage owners to harvest profits and
charges of speculation by developing not re-invest or invest elsewhere
countries. Incumbents in developing (Devaraj in Tamil Nadu). Politicians
economies rush to sell shares of newly also expect payoffs and without
privatized companies and export capital from transparency practice is silently
domestic investment. Politicians look to encouraged. Resentment of labor vs.
capitalize on same trend and force closer link owner as incumbents keep out
with business. newcomers
Income Distribution Uneven income distribution discourages Consumers see through potential
Trends and Inequality workers in developed countries leading to hypocrisy of codes and do not see
Perceptions push back on free trade issues. Consumers equality. Affects consumers to be in
and employees lose faith in managers; see developing countries and those now in
system as hypocritical and abandon corporate developed countries. Consumers do not
social responsibility efforts. Developed choose on ethics and inequality will
countries' consumers overspend to keep up lead to large changes that will affect
and severe recession follows globalization on both sides.
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More importantly, these incentives build upon the already existing tensions we saw in
the first chapter. Whether social codes, in and of them, could overcome historical tensions is
not likely. The point is that in order for voluntary initiatives to create change, the incentives
must be strong enough to reduce tension so that change can occur. If industry can grow
quickly such that government realizes it has to strengthen institutions to support growth and
retain investment, then the incentives have been successful; if the incentive structure
encourages harvesting of profits and discourages long term investment, then developing
countries will still focus on economic growth and not institutional development and
concomitant regulation. Likewise, demands for standard enforcement without rewards will be
perceived as patronizing and reinforce feelings of incipient protectionism.
Table 9 reviews how social codes reinforce globalization tensions. In the next and
final chapter we shall see how offering the right incentives for social code compliance will
help these tensions be reduced.
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Chapter Five--Social Codes and Labels Will Become More
Effective with New Business Models
Bad Business Model Design Only Leaves Room for Negative Incentive
As we saw in the previous chapter, the MSIs offer very little reward for supplier
compliance, other than the ability to remain a supplier. Most likely, there are private
incentives in particular buyer-seller relationships, but there is little data on these relationships
and they are certainly not formalized into any of the policies of the MSIs. Fair Trade is the
exception to this because it offers incentives in many places and while not large, does
demonstrate that voluntary initiatives can lead to a different business model, particularly if
the initiative gains traction with consumers.
In the case of social codes, the MSIs actually reinforce the models that existed during
the time of the Multi Fiber Agreement. These models are predicated on low fixed-asset
investment and high brand investment. They are designed to purposely create tension along
the supply chain in order to induce competition among suppliers for the lowest cost. There is
no transparency along the supply chain because lack of information creates fear for loss of
business and encourages lower prices. The supply chains in this model are notable for their
lack of trust and cooperation. All of these behaviors have negative impact upon working
conditions, which the voluntary initiatives are supposed to be improving.
While long hours are the norm in any growing enterprise, there is more than ample
data to show that productivity diminishes significantly after 55-60 hours per week. Yet
productivity gains are not important to buyers in this business model because suppliers can
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be replaced. Certainly the distorted incentives of the quota period did not encourage
investment, but the changing landscape now should favor consolidation and skill-building.
It is acceptable wisdom to say that voluntary initiatives cannot change business
models, but we have seen an example of one, Fair Trade, that can create at least a new model.
However, given that the majority of the MSIs' benefactors still favor their present business
models does not give the MSIs much ability to encourage change. All of the MSIs in this
thesis have done a tremendous job of helping to improve conditions given their extremely
small budgets. They do not have the charter to mandate change in the way their members
conduct business and even if they desired one, their members would not allow it to happen.
From the companies' point of the view, MSIs are very much a voluntary initiative.
Businesses, while sincere in their efforts to improve conditions, have still made social
standards a low priority and are participating more out of fear of reputational loss than
because improved conditions will create better products and ultimately, more highly
developed economies and a larger pool of potential customers. MSIs have become
unintended allies in this effort because they lack the ability to force change in the way
businesses operate. Certainly, companies could allocate much larger resources to this task if
they determined it was a significant priority. Inditex, while not allocating more money to
MSIs chooses to own and operate much of their supply chain in high wage Spain. This is a
decision to choose better standards for the right reason; the company gets the flexibility it
desires and the state enforces the working standards.
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Why Changing Incentives along the Supply Chain is Insufficient by Itself
In many ways, the MSIs would have the easiest time changing the incentives along
the supply chain. ETI is already trying to do this by raising awareness of how buyer behavior
affects suppliers and SAI is trying to encourage more management involvement through the
SA 8000 process. To the same extent, the efforts to have buyers reveal their source factories
and sub-contractors also begin to bring understanding to the instrumental role un-monitored
sub-contractors play in most supply chains.
More information builds trust and this effort is necessary to improve conditions. It is
however not sufficient. The nature of the MSI businesses differ greatly and as Lee showed,
their supply chain should vary accordingly. In most cases, the companies should have
different supply chain structure for different ranges of products. To enable complete
information-sharing, joint decision making and incentive alignment, most companies have to
change their business model. Inditex is a good example of a company that utilizes different
supply chain structures, but will also search for a low cost supplier. It is also not perfect and
is sometimes subject to challenges about working conditions in sub-contractor's plants.
In April 2005, the Spectrum Sweater factory in Savar, Bangladesh collapsed killing
seventy-nine workers. When buyers from the factory were contacted by the Clean Clothes
Campaign, a European MSI, only Inditex immediately pledged to help the victims.' 8 2 The
other buyers were members of the BSCI who issued a statement "pledging that they would
182 Clean Clothes Campaign. (2005). "Spectrum Update: New info & demands." Retrieved March 31, 2006,
from http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/05-04-24.htm.
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send representatives to Dhaka in the first week of May to get more clarity on the
situation."' 83
Does this response imply that Inditex is a better company? Not necessarily, however,
it could easily imply that Inditex may have more flexibility in the way it responds because it
has a different business model. The BSCI members have to exercise caution because they
know that implicating themselves in the Spectrum collapse implicates them in every sourcing
decision they make.
While it is premature to look at every developing country as a potential market, many
MSI participants do not see the modeling potential that changing business models may have.
Do Toyota Motor's investments in the US mitigate complaints about Japanese competition?
Initially, they did not but as the landscape changed they have been pointed out as an example
of the way foreign investment should be made. There is little discussion about unfair
Japanese competition any more. Likewise, Toyota has thousands of employees in the US;
they are now the best word of mouth for the company and its products. Can an efficient and
agile supply chain create these incentives? Not by itself, investment and involvement are
much better signaling techniques.
Why Change will not be Consumer Led for at Least Ten More Years
Certainly, consumer-driven change could have the largest impact not only on social
codes, but on almost any 'voluntary initiative'. The fact remains however that consumers are
not presently driving market change. The evidence we presented for apparel also translate to
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sustainability initiatives. In a paper assessing the affects of ecolabels, Tom Rotherham argues
that consumers may not even be the best way forward, "It is perhaps unlikely that consumers
will remain the primary focus of ecolabelling in the future, in view of evidence that private
and public procurement policies have been important elements in the success of ecolabelling
programmes, as well as the fact that other market actors can provide more consistent and
more diverse incentives for producers. From a logistical perspective, the argument that the
consumer may not be the main focus of ecolabelling is also compelling; by negotiating with
the five main coffee buyers, it is possible to interact with 50% of the total coffee market. A
single supermarket chain, Tesco, represents one-eighth of all consumer retail spending in the
UK." 184
Fair Trade is a useful counterpoint in this thesis, not only because it sets up better
incentives than the code MSIs, but because it has received consumer and corresponding
market acceptance. Yet, even at projected 2007 sales of $1.8B, Fair Trade cannot be used as
a model for the worldwide $900B textile trade. Consumers will ultimately respond to social
and sustainability issues in larger numbers; the question is when and how will we get to a
critical mass. Certainly, as previously mentioned, most research indicates this will not
happen for another ten to fifteen years, if then.
One thing the research does point out is that perhaps the best way to do this is through
modeling behavior. Like the Toyota example, employees are a simple, but very effective way
to communicate company beliefs to others. Worcester and Dawkins address employees as
perhaps the best way forward for communicating ethics, "In particular, employees tend to be
perceived by external stakeholders as particularly credible commentators on a company's
184 Rotherham, T. (2004). The Trade and Environmental Effects of Ecolabels: Assessment and Response.
Geneva, Switzerland, United Nations Environmental Programme: 1-44.
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activities; for example, the majority of the British public say that when hearing about a
company's contribution to society and the environment, they would be more likely to believe
the word of someone who worked for that company brochure or advert... Therefore, in the
communication of ethical issues to consumers, the influence of informal communication
networks should not be underestimated. There is a propensity for customers, employees and
other stakeholders to act as advocates of those companies they perceive as ethical, and
conversely to act as saboteurs of those companies they perceive as unethical."' 85
Given the sheer number of employees that work in the industries MSIs focus on, the
signaling and modeling potential is enormous; both at the developed country end and at the
sourcing start. The long term potential of having well-treated and respected employees can
go a long way in helping to build a brand in potentially underdeveloped but large markets.
However, this potential cannot occur in the present environment where management is
incented to harvest profits and not reinvest in future long-term growth. While the low capital
intensity of many of the industries reinforces harvesting, the end of the MFA regime will
finally allow for best-practice companies to consolidate and grow without fear of bumping
into quota limits.
The alignment of employee interest with company interests can also be reflected in
the growing disparity between worker pay and management pay. This tension can only be
reduced by example and if it cannot be solved in the developed world it has little chance of
being solved in developing countries. While the rightful provenance of this charter may
185 Worcester, R. and J. Dawkins (2005). Surveying Ethical and Environmental Attitudes. The Ethical
Consumer
R. Harrison, T. Newholm and D. Shaw. London ; Thousand Oaks, SAGE: 189-203.
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belong with government and taxation policy, certainly aligning incentives throughout an
organization will provide better results.
Dan Rees of ETI addressed this issue when asked about corporate senior management
involvement with ETI, "The people care about what we do, but the company does not."
' 186
Certainly, the voice of the company is its leadership and it is a reasonable to question how
committed senior management is to the MSIs mission. This statement also reflects on the
investment companies make in the MSIs. Employees will listen to what mangers say, but
ultimately will follow where the company spends its money.
If consumers are going to begin to drive market change, aligning incentives at the
employee-level throughout the supply chain may be the best way to get them motivated to
make purchasing decisions based on ethical and sustainability issues in addition to the
normal decision parameters.
How Stakeholders Need to Focus on Economic Justification
Business, which is the financial driver of the MSIs, has a much larger stake in the
success of social codes than they may immediately think. Judging by their investment levels
and lack of senior management involvement, business views social-code voluntary initiatives
as a mitigation tool with some learning to be gained. What they need to realize is that the
business and social environment in developing countries is extremely dynamic and they may
be underestimating certain opportunities.
186 Rees, D. (2006). Interview with Dan Rees, Director ETI. London.
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MSIs need to play a much larger role in this by not only focusing on buyer behavior,
but on buyer economics. Given the evidence of so much merchandise being sold on
markdown, does it make sense for traditional retailers to continue their same practices?
Marks & Spencer (M&S) is a good example of a traditional retailer that has shifted
most of it sourcing form domestic supply to overseas. M & S prided itself on its relationships
with its suppliers; it was one of four companies selected for inclusion in I.D. Lewis' book,
The Connected Corporation--how leading companies win through customer-supplier
relationships. '87Keith Blois comments, "...Lewis selected four companies who in the early
1990s were recognized as international leaders in the management of customer-supplier
relationships. One of these companies was M&S where, with the support of Sir Richard
Greenbury (for M&S was very proud of the way it managed its relationships with suppliers),
Lewis interviewed managers at a variety of levels in the organization and met with several of
their suppliers. According to Greenbury, over some 70 years ago, M&S had developed a
special relationship with all its suppliers. A fundamental feature was that M&S expected to
carry on doing business with a supplier season after season, year after year." 188
When M&S decided to move offshore, it selected their best British suppliers
and encouraged them to also move with them. "Rather than abandon these relationships, we
picked our best British suppliers and asked them to work with us in setting up lower cost,
responsibly managed operations overseas. Some of these are owned and managed by our UK
suppliers; others are established through shared equity agreements between UK
187 Lewis, I. D. (1995). The Connected Corporation--How Leading Companies Win through Customer-Supplier
Relationships. New York, The Free Press.
s88 Blois, K. (2003). ""Is It Commercially Irresponsible to Trust?"" Journal of Business Ethics 45(3): 183-193.
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manufacturers and local suppliers, with significant input from trained UK management to
ensure responsible working conditions as well as quality of product."' 189
While M&S has had its share of recent corporate challenges; the commitment of
senior management and their willingness to be fully committed to their suppliers demonstrate
how they view their supply chain. M&S is a member of ETI, yet it will yield better results
than other members because the company realizes the considerable economic value of a good
supply chain.
MSIs can serve as catalysts with members such as M&S, because M&S translates
their learning into superior financial performance along the supply chain. Nike's failure to
notice the lifestyle shoe phenomenon has cost the company perhaps in excess of $200M of
lost revenue. John Shanley, a financial analyst recently commented, "Several large retailers,
he said, have warned of stagnant European demand for Nike's premium footwear lines "due
to both shopper resistance to higher-priced athletic footwear and a strong consumer
movement towards lifestyle footwear styles," which have proved successful at competitors
such as Puma and Adidas-Salomon. Shanley warned that Nike has lost market share in Japan
to Adidas as consumers gravitate towards more "lifestyle" shoes, while a high level of
promotions have hurt margins."' 90 Part ofNike's failure to respond quicker has been
attributed to its dependence on partnerships on performance shoes and nowhere else. Is there
economic justification for them to reconsider their business model?
189 Johnson, M. (2004). "Marks & Spencer Implements an Ethical Sourcing Program for Its Global Supply
Chain." Journal of Organizational Excellence 23(2): 3-16.
190 Portland Business Journal (2006). Nike downgraded; stock falls. Portland Business Journal. Portland,
Oregon. March 7, 2006.
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MSIs and their stakeholders have built an excellent information gathering system.
While industry is starting to appropriate this hard-earned information for its own through
renewing sector initiatives and clearinghouses, MSIs still can serve to help facilitate, first
training and ultimately, consolidations of complying suppliers. They can serve to help
suppliers think about outside capital, sell minority interests and otherwise prepare better
performing companies for eventual market flotation. All of these events increase
organizational transparency and will produce better conditions as companies seek to attract
talented employees.
To accomplish this task, MSIs should consider diversifying their funding sources as
they move more into capacity-building and away from just monitoring and compliance. MSIs
will be well served by this diversification because it will give them more leverage with both
buyers and suppliers. Moreover, if MSIs are to change their perception as agents of supplier
compliance into true capacity-building organizations, they must have more funding and
different funding sources. If MSIs can assume this role, then they will have not only the
proverbial stick, but the carrot as well.
Risk of Commodization by Outsourcing Increases as Fragmentation
Decreases
Another way to look at economic justification for changing business models is to
understand the phenomenon Clayton Christensen noticed in the technology field. Christensen
realized that continuing efforts to outsource production ultimately led to the risk of
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commodization by the manufacturer. 191 Lee Kuan Yew discusses this with respect to China,
"They are learning. They have learned from the Americans; from M&A, takeovers and
mergers. They know that if they try to sell their computers under a Chinese brand, it will take
them decades in America. But if they buy IBM, they can inject their technology and low cost
into IBM's brand name, and gain much faster access to the market."' 92
Li & Fung, one of the agents that prospered under the MFA regime, has drastically
altered their business model and is a compelling example of the risk certain companies will
face by commodization. In the last few years, Li & Fung has bought or licensed well know
brands in the developed world and is now controlling the production, logistics and actually
manages the inventory of these brands for retailers. They are still one step removed from the
customer and may choose to remain this way, though it would certainly be easy enough to do
SO.
Esprit Holdings is another example, although one that took a tortuous route, of a
supplier taking over the brand. Its problems with family control and management well
documented, the company was at one point operated separately in three continents.
Ultimately, the European and Asian operating divisions bought the original US Company;
though it has not been that successful in the US to date, Esprit has sales in excess of $3B
annually.
While Li & Fung has not purchased their suppliers and we have no data that their
supply chain is more social code compliant than others, their model should be perceived as a
threat to developed country retailers and brands at some point. If retailers and brands
'91 Christensen, C. M. and M. E. Raynor (2003). The innovator's solution : creating and sustaining successful
growth. Boston, Mass., Harvard Business School Press.
192 Hoyng, H. and A. Lorenz (2005). "It's stupid to be afraid". Spiegel special 7: 142-146.
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continue to focus on their present business model, they will continue to lose leverage as
suppliers build power through consolidation in the post-MFA world. As family control of
well-known brands enters generational-transfer issues, suppliers will be poised to take
advantage of buying opportunities as they see fit. While the market leverage still continues
for buyers, suppliers will begin to exert more power as the era of quota shopping disappears.
The danger to existing players is not vertical integration itself, but the premise that
integration will start from the bottom up.
How a Newly Fixed Playing Field Requires New Models
MSIs are by design voluntary and as we have seen, they do not have a clear mandate
to force business to change operating models or for that matter even their behavior. Given
this, can MSIs be more effective at improving social conditions and if so, how can they do it?
Likewise, companies, whose business models have been based on sticking to core
competencies, such as building brands, marketing and merchandising, are not prepared for a
world that has become less fluid than previously. What should companies do? Are the goals
of the MSIs and its business stakeholders similar enough to actually get governments to take
on regulation?
Setting up the right incentives for both MSIs and companies is very possible if
companies are willing to reassess how they have operated in the past. As the MFA regime
ends, companies need to realize that their old business models with the emphasis on only an
efficient supply chain and inherent low cost advantages will need to be replaced. Companies
that move to invest in key suppliers will build more flexibility in a world where scale is no
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longer the advantage it was. This is not to imply that business should vertically integrate or
even take control of suppliers but rather adopt a portfolio theory that has been previously
applied to the venture world.
The investment can come in many forms. As we have seen with Inditex, this can be
majority or minority owned suppliers or as with Marks & Spencer, this can be through no
equity investment but issuance of long term contracts and willingness to open up the supply
chain to joint decision making. This is the example Devaraj preferred. Long term interest
through equity or contracts signals that both the buyer and supplier has placed their trust in
the relationship and are willing to align their incentives.
MSIs can help to identify potential partners or even form investment groups for non-
competing members that can serve as an investment vehicle. The resulting required
transparency will get buyers to again open their supply chain decision making. Through this
method, buyers can build supply chain expertise in all four areas of Lee's matrix giving them
flexibility and scale, while allowing them to hedge their risk.
Likewise, investment will require management involvement on the buyer's behalf,
giving both the supplier access to new skills and likewise building expertise in the buyer's
organization. It can provide for a training ground for young buyers and managers and better
internationalize the operation.
Why New Models Will Work and Drive Social Improvement
"For all the complaints of factory owners, though, the situation has a silver lining for the
members of the world's largest labor force. Economists say the shortages are spurring
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companies to improve labor conditions and to more aggressively recruit workers with
incentives and benefits."' 93 The New York Times, April 3, 2006
In this era of globalization, most countries seek rapid economic development. As
such, they have put aside most of their regulation and enforcement efforts to ensure the
country's competitiveness. By direct investment in a country's suppliers, buyers are signaling
that they are willing to take a risk that the country will strengthen their institutions to support
business. This is the critical factor that is missing in all of social code work. Ultimately, the
government will need to take responsibility for those activities that rightfully belong to it. No
business or MSI can play this role.
MSIs, utilizing their more diversified and larger funding base, however will find
themselves as agents of change and development. More importantly, building up a local
industry will allow for regulation demands to be made at the supplier level as suppliers look
to create a level playing field. At the same time, labor and NGOs will continue to lobby for
better conditions which may force the government to listen to its growing domestic industry.
Developing countries have a huge need to encourage industry and this goal outweighs others,
yet they have a large stake in maintaining foreign investment and if investments are made as
opposed to buyer-supplier relationships, they will be more prone to act. Western companies
have a track record of paying more and having better conditions in their overseas plants than
domestic suppliers; wages in foreign subsidiaries or joint ventures in China are 35% higher
than domestically owned enterprises. 194
193 Barboza, D. (2006). Labor Shortage in China May Lead to Trade Shift. New York Times. New York.
194 Lorenz, A. and W. Wagner (2005). Cheap and Cheerful? Spiegel special 7: 30-39.
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If the gains from supply chain flexibility and transparency are to be achieved, a better
trained and better paid workforce is mandatory. Conditions in successful companies that have
incentives to reinvest are different than those where owners harvest profits, whether in
Bangladesh, China or Massachusetts. In a recent editorial, the New York Times addresses the
success of Chinese manufacturers, "China's move up the textile ladder will produce the same
difficult changes that other countries have experienced--among them persistent problems of
what to do with the workers whose jobs leave. But workers in China are seeing their wages
and benefits increase, and China's progress bodes well for workers in poorer places like
Cambodia, Bangladesh and Madagascar." 195
By making commitments to partnerships, companies invest in suppliers through
equity or long term contracts and suppliers will respond by having higher paid, better trained
and motivated workers in a more responsible environment. Likewise, MSIs will be able to
show that moving up the social code compliance ladder actually brings rewards and gets the
source country one step closer to economic development and ultimately its own regulation of
labor and environmental issues.
The Virtuous Cycle
"...it is the justification for right conduct by business leaders that should be the object
of scholar's attention rather than conscience, which varies from person to person" Douglas S.
Sherwin' 96
Now we can see how new incentives will reduce the larger globalization tensions
identified in Chapter One. In Table 10, we list some of the potential incentives and potential
195 New York Times Editorial (2006). Trading Up in China. The New York Times. New York. April 8, 2006.
196 Sherwin, D. S. (1983). The Ethical Roots of the Business System. Harvard Business Review: 1-9.
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business model changes we discussed previously and match them up against the trends. For
each trend, we can see that changing the incentives reduces tensions between North and
South, just as they reduce the tension between buyer and supplier. The key issue is that MSIs
and business have to actively encourage economic development in developing countries. This
is the most likely path to push regulation back into the hands of its rightful owner, the source
country's government.
Table 10 New Business Models Reduce Globalization Tensions
Globalization Trend Why Relevant
Industrialization, De- Rapid development in the South favors virtuous cycle there. Northern
Industrialization and the countries can participate if they a) are willing to invest and b) realize
Virtuous Circle their indirect employees will be their future customers
Manufactures, Tariffs and Increased levels of outsourcing improve manufacturing skill base in
Protectionism South. Brand owners face high risk of being commoditized if they have
no manufacturing knowledge as playing field becomes fixed. New
business models need to be considered
GATT, MFA and China's The playing field is soon to be fixed, distorted incentives under MFA
Entry into the WTO and ATC now finished. Allows for disintermediation and investment
possibilities
Capital Market Development Developing capital markets allow for newcomers and force incumbents
to open up. Transparency becomes desirable and reward structure
favors equity ownership
Income Distribution Trends Uneven income distribution does not encourage ethical behavior.
and Inequality Perceptions Employees may want to do the right thing, but helpless without top
management setting an example. Management needs to align interests
and invest knowing there is strong economic justification.
Companies need to recognize the potential long term threats to their business models
and see the long term economic opportunities, both at the consumer and commercial level,
which exist in developing countries. MSIs need to state these issues and get members on
track to potentially alter the way they operate. They need to also adapt their model to attract
larger and more diverse funding sources which allow them the leverage they need.
Voluntary initiatives can serve to bring morals and change into the marketplace, but
ultimately economic actors require economic justification to pursue these goals. Business has
118
always had and always will have challenges with morality, particularly in a world with many
cultures and many goals. Yet economic development has a strong sense of continuity that can
be forecast and well-managed businesses can see opportunities along this horizon. Of course,
there is uncertainty but businesses' reluctance to change only increases uncertainty and
reduces economic opportunities as we have seen.
MSIs that understand this phenomenon will be more effective because they will bring
economic justification to the supplier level and not just compliance to buyers. There is truth
to the virtuous cycle and businesses will see that they have more to gain by encouraging
development than by imposing standards without concomitant rewards. The New York
Times, in the same editorial as above is addressing the protectionist trend we identified, "All
this speaks to how woefully misguided it is for members of Congress to respond to these
pressures by trying to stop the flow of goods from China. The better off China is, the better
of the rest of the world is-poor countries because they will get a shot at the jobs that leave
China; rich countries because many more people over in China may finally be able to afford
the expensive goods that are made in America."' 97
The ability of companies to solve social issues is indeed limited; society's mandate
for companies in a capitalistic world is ultimately to efficiently produce and distribute
economic benefits. Yet companies that combine self-interest with an understanding of the
inherent tensions of globalization will perform better when they align incentives throughout
their organization and supply chain. Because the interests of management and labour, buyer
and supplier, are aligned and because transparency is designed and built into a company's
197 New York Times Editorial (2006). Trading Up in China. The New York Times. New York. April 8, 2006.
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relationships and culture, capacity-building becomes second nature and economic gains
follow.
Negative publicity and reputational risk are catalysts to start change; they are not a
solution. NGO's that expose corporate bad behavior contribute to society but only to the
extent that they or subsequent organizations help identify solutions. The ability to work with
disparate groups is an essential skill critical to any organization's success. The MSIs we have
examined have made great progress in this regard, but they will not be effective in bringing
the goal of improved conditions to developing countries until these countries have enjoyed
enough economic success that they have more to lose by not enforcing regulation than they
have by shirking it.
Most of the MSI companies have CSR departments. These programs, while expedient
for publicity reasons and yielding benefits that are still difficult to quantify, potentially mask
real economic justification for looking at new business models; just as the MSIs
unintentionally facilitated the traditional low fixed-asset investment business model of the
brands and retailers.
The ability to create a market of consumers from the same society that assembled the
company's product inexpensively builds trust for future corporate expansion. Global brands
and retailers must recognize that setting up the right incentives will allow workers to feel
good about the products they create. The assumption that Western brands will be well placed
in developing countries because of their head start is misplaced. As development and the
confidence it brings awaken nationalistic pride, Western brands will need the goodwill they
created through their investments in their supply chains. As we have seen, employees may be
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the best spokespeople for their companies and harsh memories of bad behavior will
ultimately speak louder than all the negative publicity generated by watchful NGO's.
Finally, companies that change business models will profit now from improved and
more flexible supply chains and profit later when their employees or partner's employees
become consumers. Likewise, society benefits as economic development increases and
governments strengthen their institutions and ultimately take on their rightful task of
enforcing labor conditions. It is at this point that social code MSIs can claim success.
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